

Dispatches and Statements from UN First Committee

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Dear All,

Please find here a mass of material from the First Committee just gone, which I attended from approx 6 October, until 16th October. First Committee itself is from 3 Oct to 3 November, though the voting on resolutions has I believe, largely taken place by now.

My own part in it all together with Steven Starr, has been to:

--Organise a panel on operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, sponsored by the government of Chile and chaired by Ambassador Labbe in conference room E on 14th Oct, at which the speakers were myself, Steve Starr, and prominent US nuclear weapons experts Hans Kristensen and Geoffrey Forden.

--Attend and speak briefly at a panel organised by the Swiss and NZ governments and the East-West Institute, at which the 'Re-framing De-Alert' document was presented, and at which prominent speakers were Ambassador Labbe, Ambassador Sergio Duarte (UN Undersecretary for Disarmament), Sergei Rogov, Sidhu Pal Singh of the East-West Institute, and General Eugene Habinger former commander of US Strategic Command.

--Make as many contacts as possible.

--Attend the annual gathering of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament.

I have accumulated a mass of cards, some of which will certainly be useful in promoting the vital agenda of lowering operating status of nuclear weapon systems and moving toward the abolition of nuclear weapons sooner rather than later.

The items below are largely texts from the First Committee itself.

Please note that the final votes on first committee resolutions are in the LAST ITEM, which is massive.

Your attention is also drawn to the statement by Ambassador Hellgren of Sweden on behalf of the European Union (I was able to congratulate him on having gone up in the world), and to the statement by Caroline Millar on behalf of Australia. This year Australia sponsored the text on the CTBT, and I saw them scurrying around obtaining co-sponsors.

I hope and trust that all this is useful.

John Hallam

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Sixty-fourth General Assembly
First Committee
8th Meetings (PM)

New Brand of Nuclear Arms Race, Ballooning Defence Budgets, Still-Full Nuclear

Arsenals Challenge Renewal of Non-Proliferation Regime, First Committee Hears

Terrorism Alarming in Context of Mass Destruction Weapons Spread;
Global Action Needed Since Some Networks Better-Resourced Than Small States

The national defence budgets of the major Powers had ballooned, regional disputes had festered, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East, new conflicts had emerged and a new kind of arms race threatened the progressive disarmament and non-proliferation landscape, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) heard today as it concluded its general debate.

“The nuclear arms race is taking place in a new manner, while we see no nuclear disarmament,” the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said. During the cold war era, the nuclear arms race had been confined to two super-Powers, but now it was taking place among all nuclear Powers, in a more competitive way, aiming at the modernization of nuclear weapons. Worse still, the modernization of those weapons had reached a dangerous stage.

That stage had set the scene for the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, he warned. “The United States calls for a world without nuclear weapons deserves to be welcomed if it presupposes disarmament of nuclear weapons in those countries with the largest nuclear arsenals,” he said. “When States with the largest nuclear arsenals take the lead in nuclear disarmament, it will positively influence the newly emerged nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world and also contribute to total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

Total elimination was the whole point, said Lebanon’s representative. The coming 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the ideal legal framework in which to resolve non-proliferation issues. The opportunity should also

be seized to meet expectations and shed the apathy that had given rise to new nuclear threats. "We must not waste this opportunity," he implored. "This is not about simply reducing nuclear arsenals, but about total elimination."

It was clear that the modernization of new types of nuclear weapons was taking place, tests were being conducted and nuclear arsenals were still full, said the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Strategic defence arguments might have reflected the justification of States to possess these weapons, but right now, there appeared to be a new arms race. States attempting to improve nuclear weapons should opt for a more constructive approach. "We need to return to a denuclearized world," he said, adding: "We need to limit the expansion and development of nuclear weapons."

For arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures to succeed, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced by effective actions for the peaceful settlement of disputes, Pakistan's speaker asserted. To restore and reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime, a new global non-proliferation and disarmament construct was required, based on the principles of non-discrimination and universally applicable criteria. There was also need to equitably mainstream in the nuclear order those States that had never been parties to the NPT.

Maldives' representative said that the continued scourge of terrorism was particularly alarming in the context of the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. With collective efforts, the international community must ensure that such a frightening and very real possibility did not materialize, especially since some terrorist or organized crime networks had more resources than small States.

Stressing that the nuclear proliferation threat was real, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations said "turning a blind eye to States that are stockpiling and developing nuclear weapons while refusing to submit to international inspection is gravely dangerous". International efforts in the region should start with concerted pressure on Israel, a declared nuclear-weapon State, to accede to the NPT. It was also vital to push for the implementation of the 1995 package deal on the Treaty's indefinite extension, in particular the resolution on the Middle East. "Anything else will prove devastating and could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region," he said.

Statements in the general debate were also made by the representatives of Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Tunisia, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo and the Permanent Observer of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

The representative of the Republic of Korea spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 13 October, to consider follow-up of resolutions and decisions it adopted at its past session, to have an exchange with the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, and other high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament, and to begin its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to conclude its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items before the General Assembly. (For background on the Committee's session and a summary of reports before it, see Press Release GA/DIS/3384).

NHAMO MATAMBO (Zimbabwe) stressed the urgent need for the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and called upon States that had not yet joined the treaty to do so without delay. Encouraged by the positive atmosphere in the field of disarmament, he noted key developments, including a successful NPT preparatory meeting for the 2010 Review Conference, the broken Conference on Disarmament deadlock and the Security Council's summit. He encouraged Member States to fully exploit the prevailing positive atmosphere, in order to resolve the security challenges that had dogged the international community in recent decades.

Acknowledging the NPT as the cornerstone of disarmament and non-proliferation, he said that in order to achieve nuclear disarmament, States should fully comply with their obligations. Nuclear-weapon States in particular must commit to the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Zimbabwe supported the call for the negotiation and conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Zimbabwe also supported the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and encouraged reinvigorated efforts to bring it into force. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were also an effective contribution to efforts to strengthen regional peace and security, and in that regard, the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) had been an important achievement. He called upon nuclear-weapon States that had not ratified its relevant annexes to do so and to respect their provisions. He also called for the early establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, in compliance with the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference resolution.

He regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to reach consensus on procedural issues and appealed to all Member States to demonstrate flexibility and political will to achieve tangible results in the forthcoming session. Likewise, the United Nations Disarmament Commission needed strengthening. He also called on States that had not ratified or signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).

Small arms and light weapons also seriously threatened peace, security and economic development, and it was imperative for the international community to mobilize financial and technical assistance to support African countries to implement the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in

All its Aspects.

Zimbabwe had signed and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention), he said, adding his hope that the second Review Conference next month would prioritize action on the provision of financial, technical and material resources to landmine clearance programmes in affected countries in order to create a world free of landmines.

He stressed that all States had the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries facing energy challenges. Renewed commitment towards disarmament should spill over into the area of military spending, and more funds should be diverted from arms to development.

JOSÉ IKONGO ISEKOTOKO, Director of the Ministry of the Interior and Security, Democratic Republic of the Congo, said that the existence of nuclear weapons was a great concern for everyone, but that the reality was that modernization of new types of nuclear weapons was taking place. Tests were being conducted. Nuclear arsenals were still full. Strategic defence arguments reflected States' justification to possess those weapons. The inflexibility and the intransigence of certain nuclear-weapon States were evident and, among other things, had blocked decisions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Against that backdrop was a new arms race, he said, calling on States that were attempting to improve nuclear weapons to opt for a more constructive approach to peace and security, aimed at establishing collective security. "We need to return to a denuclearized world," he said. "We need to limit the expansion and development of nuclear weapons." He asked the Security Council to undertake collective and binding action to achieve the disarmament and non-proliferation. There was a close relationship between peace, democracy and non-proliferation.

Following a recent workshop in Botswana on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), concerning the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, his country had established a coordinating committee to combat terrorism, he said. Nuclear activity in his country was limited solely to peaceful purposes and agricultural research. A national disarmament committee had been created to oversee the country's peace and security sector.

He said that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was committed to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. After years of war that killed 4 million people, his country had destroyed 97,661 weapons and 472 tons of munitions between 2007 and 2008. That was a small step. It needed the international community to achieve its disarmament obligations. His country had also destroyed thousands of landmines, but further work was needed, as no province had been spared from their effects. He emphasized the need for an arms trade treaty to control the weapons that were destabilizing countries in Africa.

FERDINAND NGOH NGOH (Cameroon) said that the signs of progress that had been made

in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation should not make the international community forget the remaining challenges. According to a recent study, there were 23,000 nuclear weapons and thousands of delivery systems still in existence. Global weapons production had risen to \$34 billion dollars per annum and military expenditures had reached \$1.4 trillion dollars, representing a 45 per cent increase since 1999. Those numbers pointed to the urgent need to move beyond the proclamation of good intentions and put in place concrete actions for a more secure world.

He said that, regrettably, the CTBT had still not entered into force 13 years after its opening for signature. Nuclear weapons still posed the greatest threat to human survival, and every day, the world lived with the risk of those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or other non-State actors. In that regard, his country welcomed the decision by United States President Barack Obama to convene a summit on nuclear security in April 2010 in Washington, D.C. to deal with the risks of nuclear terrorism and encourage States to secure their nuclear materials. Cameroon, however, felt that the only guarantee against the proliferation and use of atomic weapons was their complete destruction.

That was why it would not cease to fight in support of the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons, he said. Efforts in support of non-proliferation must be implemented in parallel and simultaneously with disarmament. Cameroon encouraged all States with nuclear weapons to take concrete measures for their reduction and, in time, the complete elimination of their arsenals. Cameroon also supported the appeal for the start, without delay, of multilateral negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty. Cameroon placed great hope in the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which should mark significant progress in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

Chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons were a grave preoccupation of his country, he went on. He called on all countries that had not yet done so to adhere to the judicial instruments prohibiting those weapons, in order to universalize those treaties. With regard to chemical weapons, in particular, Cameroon commended the progress since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, given the permanent danger to the environment and to populations of chemical weapons stocks. He called on all States still in possession of those weapons to proceed with their destruction, without delay.

He added that small arms and light weapons were the true weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were responsible for the death or the mutilation of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children. They were also a factor in prolonging armed conflicts and hindering reconstruction and development. Concrete measures should be put in place to ensure that implementation of the United Nations Action Programme. It was urgent to achieve vigorous international action against the illicit traffic in those weapons, which killed 300,000 people yearly.

GHAZI JOMAA (Tunisia) said that his country had always deemed it wise to redirect the resources devoted to the military to development and economic growth. Such a course would be more beneficial in meeting the needs of the civilian populations. Relaunching the disarmament process at the multilateral level was a major challenge, which the international

community should tackle in a collective manner. The Conference on Disarmament must now focus attention on the format and content of its work programme. It would also be wise to convene a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and Tunisia hoped that the open-ended working group of on that subject would renew its work and succeed in formulating a recommendation towards that goal.

Turning to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, he welcomed the progress achieved at the third preparatory meeting held in New York in May. However, he noted the lack of significant progress overall so far and said that the international community was still very far from achieving the nuclear disarmament objectives set forth in the NPT. The country called on the nuclear-weapon States to proceed towards the total elimination of their nuclear weapons arsenals. The non-nuclear- weapon States had the right to benefit from effective guarantees against the use or threat of use of those weapons against them. In the same spirit, one of the principal measures aimed at giving effect to the NPT was the CTBT. In that regard, Tunisia welcomed the organisation of the recent Security Council summit and the adoption of resolution 1887 (2009), as well as the holding of the meeting to promote the CTBT's entry into force.

Tunisia saw the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely reached by the countries concerned, as well as creation of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, as a significant means of promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he continued. In that regard, it had taken note of the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. The Middle East remained one of the most deeply affected regions by the "non-creation" of such a zone, primarily because of the failure of certain parties there to join the NPT and place their installations under IAEA safeguards. The international community and influential Powers should take measures to create such a zone in the region.

EDEN CHARLES (Trinidad and Tobago) said that all States had a responsibility to ensure that people lived in a world that was free from nuclear weapons. That conviction had led his country to become party to the NPT and other international treaties aimed at the institution of effective safeguards against proliferation, as well as the destruction of certain types of weapons. Only recently, his country had joined the 182 states which had signed the CTBT. It expected to ratify it in the near future. Signing the Test-Ban Treaty was not only another step in promoting disarmament, but also provided an opportunity to profit from the civilian benefits provided under that instrument in areas such as seismography.

He said that Trinidad and Tobago, as a producer of petrochemicals, was cognizant of the potential for abuse of those products. His country was committed to the peaceful uses of chemistry and, therefore, had become a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention several years ago. It continued to implement its obligations under that convention. Its petrochemical production facilities had been inspected on several occasions by teams from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It also met its other obligations by making annual declarations pursuant to article X, paragraph 4 of the Chemical Weapons Convention's verification regime and was in the process of finalising the implementing legislation to give effect to that Convention. Similarly, work was ongoing on legislation to give domestic legal effect to the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Trinidad and Tobago was convinced that all actions aimed at disarmament should be tackled primarily through multilateral initiatives, with the United Nations at the fore, he said. It was deeply concerned, however, about the reticence of some Member States to address other priority issues on the disarmament agenda, specifically the challenges posed by small arms and light weapons. For his country and other Caribbean Community (CARICOM) States, that category of conventional weapons represented a clear and present danger to the well-being of the citizenry of the region. The illegal trade in those weapons had contributed significantly to an increase in criminal activity, with illegal trade in narcotics a core aspect of that activity in the region. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons was also linked to terrorism and armed conflict.

It was widely acknowledged that the illegal arms trade was cross-border in character and therefore required multilateral action to stem its proliferation, he said. Prime Minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had called on all States which had not been supportive of concluding a legally binding arms trade treaty to "join the fold". Those included large States, which were major manufacturers and exporters of small arms and light weapons. Those countries had a moral responsibility to assist in that struggle. An arms trade treaty, which provided globally-acceptable standards governing the import, export and transfer of conventional weapons, was the only viable option to address an issue which threatened the peace and security of many States, especially small island developing States, such as Trinidad and Tobago.

ABDUL GHAFUOR MOHAMED (Maldives) welcomed recent positive momentum in the field of disarmament, including the United States-Russian Federation talks and the Conference on Disarmament's progress. As a small island State, Maldives faced vulnerabilities. Small States often did not have the resources or means to defend themselves from the emerging threats, including the many and varied forms of international terrorism and organized crime. The continued scourge of terrorism was particularly alarming in the context of the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. With collective efforts, the international community must ensure that such a frightening and very real possibility did not materialize.

He said that some terrorists and crime networks had more resources than small States. Small arms and light weapons provided those non-State actors with the lethality they required to cause chaos in countries and destabilize whole regions. He called upon the international community to step up efforts to strengthen effective arms control mechanisms to ensure a halt to the spread of those weapons. Maldives supported nuclear-weapon-free zones and underlined that confidence-building measures, at regional and subregional levels, were fundamental to the creation of such zones.

Since Maldives had adopted a new Constitution last year, policies and statues governing the control and movement of arms were being put in place to ensure that the country met its international obligations. New legislation strengthened the domestic counter-terrorism machinery. Maldives remained committed to a vision of nuclear-weapon-free world, and was now party to major disarmament treaties and conventions.

FADI ZIADEH (Lebanon) said that this pivotal time in the history of disarmament had been

marked by recent positive developments, including the Security Council summit. The momentum should continue, and the CTBT progress should be followed by the treaty's entry into force. The September conference to facilitate the treaty's operation had highlighted the need to dissipate threats of weapons of mass destruction. Against the backdrop of significant developments in 2009, flowing from the financial crisis and various regional conflicts and disputes, there was a renewed focus on disarmament. Lebanon wished to underscore the positive signals and call for a world free of nuclear weapons.

He said that Lebanon welcomed the recent progress of the Conference on Disarmament. Also welcome had been the adoption by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of two resolutions related to the Middle East and Israel. Lebanon underlined the importance of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The coming 2010 NPT Review Conference served as the ideal legal framework in which to resolve non-proliferation issues. The opportunity should also be seized to meet expectations. The lack of a universal character to that convention demonstrated a degree of apathy, resulting in the appearance of new nuclear threats. "We must not waste this opportunity," he implored. "This is not about simply reducing nuclear arsenals, but about total elimination."

Small arms and light weapons also wreaked havoc, with the current count of half a billion of those weapons causing deaths and injuries, with 90 per cent of victims being civilians, he said. Lebanon had always abided by international law, choosing the path of peace and security. It did not possess nuclear weapons. It had also signed the NPT and other treaties, and was in the process of adopting a resolution regarding ballistic weapons.

Owing to the reality that anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs used by Israel -- killing children on their way to school -- Lebanon had participated in the work on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and called on States, including Israel, to sign and ratify that Convention. He also called on Israel to comply with IAEA resolutions. Conflicts should be resolved by tackling the root causes. For Lebanon, that meant addressing occupation and exploitation. "The history of humankind was replete with war and human suffering," he said. "It was time to work towards eliminating nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction."

SIN SON HO (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that nuclear disarmament was the most pressing issue in ensuring world peace and security, and added that the brutal devastating affects of nuclear weapons, as seen in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were a reminder of the damage that could be done. The first ever nuclear weapon had been manufactured by the State with the largest nuclear arsenals. "The nuclear arms race is taking place in a new manner, while we see no nuclear disarmament," he said, noting that during the cold war era, the nuclear arms race was confined to two super-Powers. "Now, after the end of the cold war, it is taking place among all nuclear Powers, in a more competitive way, aiming at modernization of nuclear weapons. Worse still, the modernization of nuclear weapons has reached such a dangerous stage."

That stage, he warned, had set the scene for the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea demanded total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

“The United States’ call for a world without nuclear weapons deserves to be welcomed if it presupposes disarmament of nuclear weapons in those countries with the largest nuclear arsenals,” he said. “When States with the largest nuclear arsenals take the lead in nuclear disarmament, it will positively influence the newly-emerged nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world and also contribute to total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

He pointed to the current situation of the Korean peninsula as a clear example proving why nuclear disarmament remained “stalemated” in the international arena. Due attention should be paid to issues, including that “the United States nuclear threat is the main factor of acute confrontation in the Korean peninsula. Having designated the DPRK as one of the targets for pre-emptive nuclear strikes in 2002, the United States continues conducting large-scale nuclear war exercises on a regular basis on the Korea peninsula and around its vicinity.” In March and August, multiple tests involving different weapons of mass destruction had been conducted.

The NPT had been unable to foil nuclear-weapon deployment on the peninsula by a State that possessed the largest nuclear arsenals, or to stop its nuclear threat, he said. “The NPT has stipulated that the nuclear-weapon States are obliged to dismantle nuclear weapons, nevertheless, the offender, who introduced nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula while resorting to nuclear blackmail, is now attempting to label the DPRK as an unlawful State by abusing international law. Unfortunately, this is today’s reality in international relations.”

The recent satellite launch conducted by his nation was in accordance with all international procedures, he said.

“If the United States continues to threaten the DPRK with nuclear weapons, there will be no other way but to strengthen the self-defensive deterrence for the safeguard of national sovereignty and dignity,” he continued. “This is the final conclusion we have reached after half a century-long DPRK-United States confrontation. If the Korean peninsula is to be denuclearized, the United States should terminate its nuclear threat and hostile policy for a ‘regime change’ in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

The role of the disarmament machinery was more important than ever before, and this Committee should enhance its role in nuclear disarmament as an organ dealing with disarmament issues, he urged. The Conference on Disarmament was the most useful United Nations body to promote global disarmament.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said that the objective of disarmament and global peace and stability could not be effectively pursued in isolation from certain realities that marked the contemporary global and regional security situation. Those realities included regional and global imbalances and asymmetries in defence spending, which were counterproductive to arms control objectives and undermined attempts to establish peace and security. Despite the end of the cold war, the national defence budgets of the major Powers had continued to increase. Another reality was the regional disputes, which continued to fester around the globe, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East. New conflicts had also emerged. For arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures to succeed, the causes of the arms race

and threats to peace must be reduced by effective actions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

He said that a third reality related to derogation from non-proliferation norms and discriminatory exceptions for political or strategic interest and disregard for equitably applicable criteria, which had undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. In order to restore and reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime, a new global non-proliferation and disarmament construct was required, based on the principles of non-discrimination and universally-applicable criteria. There was also need for mainstreaming in the nuclear order, in an equitable manner, those States that had never been parties to the NPT. In that context, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei had referred to the “complex security perception” of those States and had called for pragmatic steps.

A final reality was the growing trend of promoting the security of some States at the cost of others through measures adopted by a select group of States outside recognised multilateral negotiating forums, he said. That undermined the principle of equal and undiminished security for all States. Since the issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation affected the vital security interests of all States, all States should have the opportunity to fully participate and play an equal role in negotiations on those issues. Multilateralism and multilaterally-negotiated, universally-accepted and non-discriminatory agreements provided the best way forward for achieving the objective of disarmament and non-proliferation.

He noted that weapons of mass destruction were not the only threat to durable international peace and stability. In parallel with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there was an urgent need for negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As laid down in the final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, those negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on militarily significant States. The disturbing trend of escalation in the number and sophistication of conventional weapons had to be arrested, as that had a causal relationship with the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons.

There was also a need to focus on conventional arms control, which was not limited to controls over only trade in conventional arms, but also included measures for arms reduction, limitation and restraint, he said. Any future arrangement on conventional arms that addressed their transfer, but not their development, production and deployment would be inequitable against countries that did not themselves produce such weapons. It would, therefore, prove difficult to conclude and implement.

He said that Pakistan’s vision of South Asia was anchored in a security architecture based on preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and conflict resolution. Its concerns arose from the growing strategic imbalance in that region, which included the recent introduction of nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Between 1974 and 1998, his country had made several proposals to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, those proposals did not elicit a positive response. As a responsible nuclear-weapon State, Pakistan was pursuing a policy of credible minimum deterrence. Its proposals for a strategic restraint regime had three interlocking elements of conflict resolution,

nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance. That warranted serious consideration and the support of the international community. Extra-regional Powers should adopt even-handed policies in South Asia and avoid steps that undermined the regional strategic balance.

BATENGUE BANKOTINE (Togo) said that the struggle against nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction was the duty of all members of the international community wishing to save the world from unspeakable suffering. His country had placed peace and security above all issues, making that its highest priority. That had been reflected by the passage of certain legislation and the implementation of laws giving effect to the relevant measures. A decree of January 1962 governed the import and manufacture of sophisticated weapons. A 2001 law established a national committee to combat small arms and light weapons. At the subregional level, the country had been a pioneer of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) moratorium on small arms and light weapons, and had been among the first to ratify the related ECOWAS Convention, which it was already implementing.

He noted that Togo, at the international level, was party to several conventions and treaties, including the Mine-Ban Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the NPT, the CTBT and many others aimed at ridding the world of the tragic effects of weapons of mass destruction. In the same spirit, Togo had requested and obtained the establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Centre on its territory. The Centre was doing valuable work, including providing advice to curb trafficking in small arms and light weapons. It had made important contributions to disarmament in the region. Togo stressed the need to increase financial and human resources support to the Centre, in order to allow it to accomplish its tasks. As for the call to convene a conference on the arms trade treaty, there was need for clarity to avoid any interpretation that might hinder the treaty's establishment.

He paid tribute to United States President Obama and Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev for their decision to reduce their nuclear arsenals. He urged all other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit. Those intending to acquire or produce those weapons should desist. The future of the planet hinged on that.

AMMAR HIJAZI, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, said that disarmament efforts must uphold international humanitarian law principles. All Member States had the duty to stop the transfer of arms to States that seriously violated those laws, including States that committed grave breaches identified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, particularly, belligerent occupying Powers that neglected their legal obligations and used indiscriminate and excessive force against civilian populations. Israel's abhorrent conduct during the war on Gaza was a clear example. Member States should pay due attention to States that armed and formed militias that resided unlawfully in an occupied land. He pointed, as an example, to the routine Israeli settlers' violence against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. States proven to continuously violate laws of war must not be allowed to use conventional weapons, such as cluster munitions, anti-personnel mines, flachette missiles, dense inert metal explosive munitions and ammunition containing depleted uranium, as well as those weapons, such as white phosphorous, not proscribed under international law.

Nuclear and non-conventional weapons represented the most serious threat to humanity's survival, and he regretted the Middle East had not yet become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Noting that Israel was the only State in the region that had neither become, nor stated its intention to become, a party to the NPT, he said that Israel had repeatedly and clearly declared it was a nuclear-weapon State and boasted of international immunity from accountability or oversight. He warned of selectivity in efforts to rid the Middle East of nuclear arms. "We maintain that turning a blind eye to States that are stockpiling and developing nuclear weapons while refusing to submit to international inspection is gravely dangerous," he said, adding that non-proliferation efforts in the region should be comprehensive, and not selective "otherwise, the good will we agree on will be wasted and the credibility of our aims will be damaged."

International efforts in the region should start with concerted pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT, he urged. Making the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free was an indispensable condition to stability and peace in the region for generations to come. Any attempt to pre-condition international accountability in that regard was a disingenuous pretext to escape adherence and at gaining yet more time to stockpile those weapons of mass destruction, without any oversight or accountability. It was vital to push for the implementation of the package deal on the indefinite extension of the NPT, in particular the resolution on the Middle East. "Anything else will prove devastating and could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region," he said. The 13 practical steps must be respected to maintain the Treaty's credibility.

Devastating and long-term effects of human rights violations, impunity, foreign occupation, underdevelopment and poverty were directly linked to disarmament efforts, he said. The Committee must address those and other issues, steeped in the reality that deadly conflicts and illicit arms trading would flourish as long as the root causes of conflicts remained unresolved.

"At a time when the world community is cooperating to overcome economic and environmental dangers, we must show equal determination to work collectively on stopping the scourges of needless and senseless wars," he concluded. "Millions of defenceless civilians, who have long suffered senseless violence and grinding poverty, count on us to do that. Only then do our future generations stand a chance at living a prosperous life, free of the worst nightmare humanity can face: a nuclear arms race and unchecked violations of human rights."

ANDA FILIP, Permanent Observer of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), said that the 2007 Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations had dealt with the issue of rule of law in international relations, with one of the sessions dedicated to the implementation of key international commitments in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. That panel had been addressed by the High representative for Disarmament, the Executive Secretary of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), the President of the Global Security Initiative, the Chair of the Mexican Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Chairman of the Security Council 1540 Committee. Much of the discussion had focused on the nuclear predicament and the need to mobilize political leadership and commitment to effectively deal with it. Many parliamentarians felt that that could simply not wait much longer.

Based on the outcome of the annual hearing, IPU members decided that the issue of nuclear

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disarmament and non-proliferation warranted more serious examination, including within parliaments themselves, she said. They, therefore, introduced the issue onto their formal agenda of work. The IPU Committee on Peace and International Security was mandated to look into the role of parliamentarians with regard to advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and securing the entry into force of the CTBT. After a rigorous process, a Parliamentary resolution had been adopted by consensus by the IPU member parliaments in April. That text carried a strong political message, and served as a call to action by parliaments and parliamentarians from around the world on those issues.

She subsequently presented examples brought forward by participating legislators where the resolution had been adopted, concerning their experiences in the adoption of national laws in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. According to her, the international community had a unique window of opportunity to make real progress towards achieving the ideal for citizens around the globe of a nuclear-weapon-free-world. That opportunity should be seized. Parliaments and parliamentarians were part of that solution, and the IPU was committed to playing its role in moving that process forward.

Right of Reply

The representative of the Republic of Korea, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the military exercise undertaken by her country had been a purely defensive one. It had given notice of that exercise to “DPRK” through the United Nations command channel.

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For information media • not an official record

Statement by H.E. Caroline Millar, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament regarding the thematic discussion on nuclear weapons, delivered on 13 October 2009.

(as delivered)

Mr Chairman,

Australia has a history of determined activism in support of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr

Rudd, reaffirmed Australia's commitment to working with other nations towards this goal in his statement to the General Assembly last month.

This commitment led Australia, with our close friend and partner Japan, to establish an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Commission aims to create the political and policy consensus necessary to elicit real results on non-proliferation and disarmament in advance of and at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and beyond.

Nuclear weapon states' leadership

Mr Chairman,

We look to states possessing nuclear weapons to exercise leadership. We were greatly encouraged by the bold re-statement of a commitment to a world without nuclear weapons by US President Obama in his 5 April speech in Prague. Support for this goal by the United States and the Russian Federation – holders of some ninety-five percent of the world's nuclear weapons – has helped generate greater momentum towards nuclear disarmament than at any time since the burst of international activity in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War.

This momentum has been increased by the United Nations Security Council's adoption by consensus of resolution 1887 on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on 24 September.

Australia warmly welcomed the announcement in June 2009 by the United States and the Russian Federation to negotiate a legally binding and verifiable successor agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before its expiration at the end of this year. Intensive negotiations are underway. We hope they will be successful and will lead to continued bilateral arms reductions between the two countries, and further such action by others.

Australia has also been encouraged by the decisions of other nuclear weapon states - by the United Kingdom's decision to reduce its fleet of Trident submarines and its number of nuclear warheads, by France's decisions to reduce its nuclear warhead capacity to less than 300 and to dismantle facilities which produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and by China's statement that it is committed to a world free of nuclear weapons.

As positive as all these steps are, Australia seeks deeper, faster, more transparent and irreversible reductions in nuclear arsenals in the nuclear weapon states, in accordance with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

We look to states possessing nuclear weapons both within and outside the NPT to reduce the numbers of these weapons, to reassess and limit the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies and to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear weapons in ways that promote global security and stability.

Non-nuclear weapons states' responsibilities

Mr Chairman

The burden of responsibility for nuclear disarmament is not the nuclear-weapon states' alone.

A world without nuclear weapons requires an equally strong commitment by non-nuclear weapon states not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept stringent international safeguards on their civil nuclear facilities. The vast majority of the world's nations, including Australia, have made such commitments and honour them scrupulously – because they judge it in their national security interests to do so.

But the actions of a few states are undermining the global consensus to contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

The DPRK's nuclear tests, most recently in May 2009, are strikingly at odds with the renewed momentum on nuclear disarmament. These tests follow a history of DPRK non-compliance with its IAEA nuclear safeguards obligations and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. UNSCR 1874 sent a clear message to the DPRK that the international community expects it to abide by its obligations under all relevant Security Council Resolutions and the commitments it has made in the Six-Party Talks to abandon its nuclear weapons program. We call on the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks without delay and work constructively towards denuclearisation.

Iran's refusal to abide by binding Security Council resolutions and failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA is also deeply troubling. Recent disclosure of Iran's covert second enrichment facility reinforces Australia's concerns, and those of the international community, about the nature of Iran's nuclear program. Further to the 1 October meeting in Geneva, we encourage Iran to work seriously with the international community to address these concerns.

Nuclear terrorism risks

Mr Chairman

All states need to take effective measures to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material. The possibility of nuclear materials getting into the hands of terrorists remains of deep concern. Australia warmly welcomes President Obama's planned nuclear security summit in 2010. We call on all states to implement fully UN Security Council resolution 1540.

First Committee outcomes: practical steps

Decisions taken in First Committee can help build the necessary political support for practical steps to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament.

We hope this year's Committee will see increased support for the resolution presented annually by Japan on Renewed Determination towards Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Australia sponsors and strongly supports this resolution.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

This year Australia will be the lead sponsor on the annual CTBT resolution. We urge all states

to support it.

At the CTBT Article XIV Conference in New York last month, we saw renewed impetus for the entry into force of the treaty. Australia welcomed the United States' participation in an Article XIV Conference for the first time in nearly a decade and strongly supported President Obama's commitment to "move forward with ratification...and work with others to bring the Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited."

Australia's also welcomes recent expressions of support for ratification and entry into force of the CTBT by China and Indonesia.

We continue to call on all States who have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty without delay, especially those nine States whose ratification is required for entry into force of the CTBT.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

Australia will sponsor the FMCT resolution at this First Committee and urges all states to support a strong text.

As one of the six Presidents of the 2009 Conference on Disarmament, Australia worked tirelessly with our P6 colleagues and with all CD members to adopt a balanced program of work including the commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT: a long-standing goal of the international community.

But despite the historic agreement on 29 May to adopt a program of work after years of inactivity, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to implement it. The reasons for this would seem to be institutional inertia and, more significantly, a calculation by a very few that stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons may not be in their security interests. If true, such a calculation would seem to run counter to current international trends and would be deeply worrying. If it is not to be consigned to irrelevance, the Conference must move quickly in 2010 not only to adopt a program of work but to start working, to start negotiating. For this to happen, we may also need engagement at political levels outside the CD to convince hold-out states that stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons enhances the security of all.

Nuclear weapon free zones

Mr Chairman

Australia is pleased to support a number of nuclear weapon free zone resolutions this year. This reflects our historic support for nuclear weapon free zones freely arrived at by regional states. We are proud of our founding role in the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

We warmly welcome the 2009 entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba which creates an African nuclear weapon free zone. By entering into force, the Treaty of Pelindaba – in conjunction with the Latin American, South Pacific and South East Asian nuclear weapon free

zones – has effectively created a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapon free zones provide practical security benefits to their members including through adherence by nuclear weapon states to the protocols containing negative security assurances. We urge all nuclear weapon states that have not done so to sign and ratify the protocols to the various nuclear weapon-free zone treaties. We look forward to the proposed second conference in 2010 of states parties and signatories to treaties by which nuclear weapon free zones are established.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference

Mr Chairman

This First Committee takes place six months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Given the renewed energy and focus world leaders have brought to the disarmament agenda, the Review Conference has the potential to shape future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in a decisive and meaningful way. NPT parties must seize this opportunity.

The 2010 Review Conference must reaffirm the collective security benefits provided by the NPT and it must deliver results across all three pillars: nuclear disarmament; non-proliferation; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition to undertaking a detailed review of the Treaty, the Conference should issue some kind of blueprint for action. With respect to the first pillar, this could be something along the lines of the 2000 Review Conference's 13 practical steps.

We should use the opportunity afforded by this First Committee session to build support for strong NPT Review Conference outcomes.

A universal commitment

Mr Chairman

All states need to undertake non-proliferation and disarmament obligations and comply with them. This includes both NPT parties and non-parties. Australia calls on those states outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Meantime, we urge them to accept non-proliferation and disarmament disciplines to the maximum extent possible.

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

Mr Chairman,

I referred at the beginning of this statement to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament established by Australia and Japan last year.

This independent Commission, chaired jointly by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth

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Evans and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, aims to produce a comprehensive, practical and action-oriented report early in 2010. We expect the report will produce recommendations on disarmament, on non-proliferation, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the interconnections between them.

The Commission has met across regions, with nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, with developed and developing countries, with NPT parties and non-parties. The Commission has held meetings in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Santiago, Cairo and New Delhi. Its inclusive approach and extensive reach has helped generate valuable new thinking which, it hopes, will help shape global thinking and build consensus both in the NPT Review Conference context and beyond.

Finally, Mr Chairman

Australia will promote strong outcomes in this Committee because they are intrinsically worthwhile, because they will help generate needed momentum to ensure successful outcomes at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and because they will enhance the security of all.

Thank you.

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Thank you.

Statement

On behalf of the European Union

by

H.E. Mr Magnus Hellgren

Ambassador

Dispatches and Statements from UN First Committee

Written by John Hallam

Monday, 02 November 2009 09:39 - Last Updated Monday, 02 November 2009 09:54

in the Nuclear Weapon Cluster

of the General Assembly First Committee

United Nations

New York

13 October 2009

1. I speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Country the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [\[*\]](#), the Country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Serbia as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

2. Despite the renewed positive momentum in global arms control, international security continues to be compromised and threatened, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as the risk that non-State actors gain access to such weapons.

3. The European Union welcomes the important resolution 1887 adopted by the Security Council on 24 September.

4. The EU is committed to work to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI and an important element in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We must preserve and

strengthen its authority and integrity. The EU will continue to promote all the objectives contained in the Treaty. The EU reiterates its call on all States not yet Party to the NPT to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The EU continues to support the Decisions and the Resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation.

5. The EU warmly welcomes the fact that the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference managed to take the necessary procedural decisions. While much work remains before consensus on the outcome for the 2010 Review Conference can be successfully built, the constructive atmosphere of the PrepCom session gave us some reason for optimism.

6. At the PrepCom the European Union presented its vision for the 2010 review cycle and made concrete proposals to this end. The current review cycle should help us reaffirm the sense of common purpose and create a more secure international context by expressing full support for the NPT's goals and obligations, by addressing the main issues at stake within all three pillars of the Treaty and by demonstrating the capacity to give appropriate responses to the current challenges. A balanced approach to the three pillars is essential. The 2010 Review Conference should adopt a set of concrete, effective, pragmatic and consensual measures for stepping up international efforts against proliferation, pursuing disarmament and ensuring a responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to develop their capacities in this field.

7. To achieve these goals, the EU has presented a set of forward-looking proposals on all three pillars of the NPT, to be part of an action plan adopted by the Review Conference.

8. In the area of non-proliferation, the EU has proposed inter alia:

- resolute action in response to proliferation crises, in particular in Iran and the DPRK;

- determination of the consequences of a State Party's non-compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations, in particular with its safeguards agreement;

- universalisation and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, in particular through the adoption and implementation by States which have yet to do so of the comprehensive safeguards agreements together with the Additional Protocol, which constitute the current verification standard;

- improvements in nuclear security and physical protection of nuclear materials;

- strengthening of export controls, also through assistance to third countries in this regard;

- cooperation to develop multilateral schemes as viable and credible alternatives to the development of exclusively national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, without prejudice to the rights in accordance with Article IV of the NPT;

- adoption of national criminal sanctions against acts of proliferation, including proliferation financing;

- development of proliferation-resistant and safeguards-friendly technologies.

9. The European Union recalls the disarmament initiatives, endorsed by our 27 Heads of State and Government, which we submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2008, and continues to encourage the international community to promote in particular:

- the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the completion of its verification regime, and the dismantling as soon as possible of all nuclear testing facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

- the opening without delay and early completion of the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis agreed in CD/1864, and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such materials, as well as the dismantlement of facilities dedicated to the

production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;

- the establishment of transparency and confidence building measures by the nuclear powers;

- early completion of the negotiations between the United States and Russia on a legally binding post-START agreement, and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the NPT, in particular by the States which possess the largest arsenals;

- the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those States which have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination;

- the start of consultations on a multilateral treaty banning short and intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles;

- the adherence to and implementation by all to the Hague Code of Conduct;

- and in addition, continuing to stress the need for general disarmament, mobilisation in all other areas of disarmament.

10. The European Union has equally ambitious proposals in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for example:

- assisting countries to plan and assess their energy needs;

- assuring a responsible development of nuclear energy in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions;

- supporting IAEA assistance programs and the IAEA nuclear security fund;

- support efforts to train the skilled workforce required to ensure a responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions;

- encouraging States to join all the relevant major nuclear conventions:

- promoting responsible management of spent fuel and nuclear waste;

- actively promoting multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including our decision to financially support the initiative to launch an IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank with up to 25 million euro, once the conditions and modalities have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

11. The EU has also proposed that the NPT Review Conference establishes a framework for dealing with the consequences of any decision to withdraw from the Treaty. A withdrawal could constitute a serious threat to

international peace and security, in particular if taken by a State Party in violation of the Treaty.

Mr Chairman,

12. The international non-proliferation regime faces major challenges. We shall continue to pursue resolute action in response to them.

13. The European Union strongly condemned the test of a nuclear explosive device carried out by the DPRK on 25 May 2009, as well as the launch of a long-range missile in April 2009, which constituted clear breaches of the UN Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718. Such actions undermine the stability of the Korean Peninsula and represent a threat to international peace and security. The EU strongly urges the DPRK to refrain from any further such activities, as well as from any launch using ballistic missile technology, to renounce its nuclear weapons programme and to return to the Six-Party Talks, aiming at the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula . The EU calls on the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as not to pursue any proliferation sensitive exports. The EU fully supports resolution 1874 and calls for its swift and robust implementation. The letter sent by the DPRK to the UN Security Council on 4 September 2009, which strives to challenge the implementation of resolution 1874, contains further provocations to the international

community.

14. Iran, like any other State party to the NPT, has the inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but the international community has to be sure that Iran complies with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement. Iran's clandestine nuclear activities, including the construction of a covert uranium enrichment facility in Qom, the composition of its nuclear programme, in particular the pursuit of enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC resolutions and its refusal to effectively cooperate with the IAEA in all respects have cast serious doubt on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We stress that Iran has the responsibility to restore international confidence in this regard. We urge Iran to follow up the meeting in Geneva on 1 October with concrete measures, including giving full transparency on the Qom project. Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activities constitute a substantial threat to regional and international security. The EU reaffirms its unequivocal support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1835. The EU urges Iran to fully comply with all these resolutions and to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing the Agency such access and information that it has requested. The EU remains firmly committed to a dual track approach. We call on Iran to work seriously with the international community in a spirit of mutual respect in order to find a negotiated solution that will address Iran's interests as well as the international community's concerns. The evolution of our relations with Iran will depend on it.

Mr Chairman,

15. Credible assurances that States are honouring their non-proliferation obligations are indispensable components of the NPT regime. The EU emphasises the essential role of the IAEA in monitoring States' fulfilment of their nuclear non-proliferation undertakings. The EU expresses its sincere appreciation to Director General ElBaradei for his successful tenure at the helm of the IAEA and congratulates his successor Ambassador Amano.

16. The EU remains fully committed to the fight against nuclear terrorism and supports all measures designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery or connected materials. In particular UNSC resolution 1540 plays a crucial role in this respect and we call on all States to pursue full implementation and application of its obligations, as well as assist others to do so. The EU is encouraged by the US initiative regarding a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world and is ready to work towards that aim. We reiterate our support to the G8 Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

17. The EU reaffirms its commitment to strong and internationally coordinated export controls to complement our obligations under the NPT. We support the further strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The EU also supports the NSG's and the Zangger Committee's outreach

activities.

Mr Chairman,

18. The EU attaches the greatest importance to the entry into force as soon as possible of the CTBT and the completion of its verification regime. The CTBT is crucial to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The EU salutes the new momentum towards further ratifications created by the announcement of President Obama that the US administration will immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification. The EU will spare no effort in promoting the early ratification of the Treaty by the few remaining Annex 2 States.

19. The EU warmly welcomes the decision in the CD earlier this year to open the negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, in accordance with CD/1864. Such a treaty is long overdue and its successful conclusion would constitute a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament efforts. While the subsequent delays in the actual start of the negotiations are profoundly disappointing, the EU trusts that all CD Member States will engage constructively in these negotiations, as well as in the substantive work on the other issues included in the Programme of Work, when the CD resumes its work in January 2010.

20. Pending the entry into force of an FMCT, the EU calls on all States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We also call on all States concerned to dismantle their facilities dedicated to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

21. The EU is committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the final objective enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. We welcome the considerable reduction in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems since the end of the Cold War, in particular by two EU Member States. We stress the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons, especially by those States with the largest arsenals. In this context, we recognise the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to establishing and upholding international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. The EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon States on the nuclear weapons they possess in particular by two EU Member States and calls on others to do likewise.

Mr Chairman,

22. Positive and negative security assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime and can act as an incentive to forego acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The European Union is committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

23. The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the UNDC in 1999. We hope that outstanding issues concerning some nuclear-weapon-free zones can be resolved through consultations, in accordance with the UNDC guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved.

24. The EU remains committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council and by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU calls on all States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. All States of the region that have not yet done so, should accede to the NPT and to the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons, and conclude with the IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Regional confidence building measures are needed. In this context, we recall our proposal presented in May this year to hold a seminar on Middle East Security, WMD non-proliferation and disarmament prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Mr Chairman,

25. Serious threats and challenges remain and we must face them with resolve. However, we note with satisfaction the growing momentum for progress towards achieving the goals enshrined in the NPT. The EU calls on all States to seize this opportunity and work together to make the world a safer place.

Thank you.

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Sixty-fourth session

First Committee

Agenda item 96

General and complete disarmament

Canada: draft resolution

Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/75 L of 16 December 1993, 53/77 I of 4 December 1998, 55/33 Y of 20 November 2000, 56/24 J of 29 November 2001, 57/80 of 22 November 2002, 58/57 of 8 December 2003 and 59/81 of 3 December 2004 on the subject of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009,

Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,

Welcoming the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of its decision of 29 May 2009 (CD/1864) for the establishment of a programme of work for its 2009 session, by which the Conference, inter alia, established a Working Group to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 of 24 March 1995 and the mandate contained therein,

Welcoming also the decisions of several States to establish moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

1. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations early in 2010 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, with a view to reaching a consensus on its text as soon as possible;

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2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

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Sixty-fourth session
First Committee
Agenda item 92

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East
Egypt: draft resolution

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of
the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of
11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14
December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9
December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12
December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30
November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4
December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December
1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996,
52/34 of 9 December 1997, 53/74 of 4 December 1998, 54/51 of 1 December 1999, 55/30 of 20
November 2000, 56/21 of 29 November 2001, 57/55 of 22 November 2002, 58/34 of 8
December 2003, 59/63 of 3 December 2004, 60/52 of 8 December 2005, 61/56 of 6 December
2006, 62/18 of 5 December 2007 and 63/38 of 2 December 2008 on the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East
consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document
of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weaponfree zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear

1 Resolution S-10/2.

A/C.1/64/L.3

2 09-54367

explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 63/38,2

1. Urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;³

2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Takes note of resolution GC(53)/RES/16, adopted on 17 September 2009 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its fiftythird regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;⁴

2 A/64/124 (Part I) and Add.1.

3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

4 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Fifty-third Regular Session, 14-19 September 2009 (GC(53)/RES/DEC(2009)).

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09-54367 3

4. Notes the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. Invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹ and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. Also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;²

9. Invites all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to the report of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1990⁵ or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

11. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

5 A/45/435.

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Sixty-fourth session

First Committee

Agenda item 99

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Palestine: draft resolution

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its relevant resolutions,

Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which are resolutions GC(53)/RES/16, adopted on 17 September 2009 and GC(53)/RES/17, adopted on 18 September 2009,¹

Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the Agency,

Recalling the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995,² in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty³ as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

¹ See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Fifty-third Regular Session, 14-18 September 2009 (GC(53)/RES/DEC(2009)).

² See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

³ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

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2 09-54694

Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference

undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty,⁴

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995,² in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards,

Noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty,

Concerned about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

Stressing the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

Emphasizing the need for all parties directly concerned to seriously consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty and, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards,

Noting that one hundred and eighty-one States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,⁵ including a number of States in the region,

1. Welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;⁶

2. Reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ and placement of all its nuclear facilities

⁴ See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article IX".

5 See resolution 50/245.

6 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", para. 16.

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under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;

3. Calls upon that State to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

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Sixty-fourth session

First Committee

Agenda item 96 (b)

General and complete disarmament: follow-up to nuclear

disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Islamic Republic of Iran: draft resolution

Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its various resolutions in the field of nuclear disarmament, including its most recent, resolutions 62/24 of 5 December 2007, and 63/46, 63/49 and 63/75 of 2 December 2008,

Bearing in mind its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty regarding the convening of review conferences at five-year intervals,

Recalling its resolution 50/70 Q of 12 December 1995, in which the General Assembly noted that the States parties to the Treaty affirmed the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopted a set of principles and objectives,

Recalling also that, on 11 May 1995, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted three decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and extension of the Treaty,²

¹ See also United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

² See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex. A/C.1/64/L.6
2 09-55117

Reaffirming the resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995 by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,² in which the Conference reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Reaffirming also its resolution 55/33 D of 20 November 2000, in which the General Assembly welcomed the adoption by consensus on 19 May 2000 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,³ including, in particular, the documents entitled “Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference” and “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty”,⁴

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,

Gravely concerned over the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty to reach any substantive agreement on the follow-up to the nuclear disarmament obligations,

Noting with satisfaction that the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty finalized the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference,

1. Determines to pursue practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹ and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;²

2. Calls for practical steps, as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all, for:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

³ 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vols. I-III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)).

⁴ Ibid., vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I.

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(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

3. Notes that the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

4. Urges the States parties to the Treaty to follow up on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty within the framework of Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty and their Preparatory Committees;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-sixth session an item entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

27 October 2009

General Assembly

GA/DIS/3399

Department of Public Information * News and Media Division * New York

Sixty-fourth General Assembly

First Committee

19th Meeting (PM)

Gravely Concerned at Danger of Possible Nuclear Weapons Use, First Committee Draft

Resolution Calls on States to Prevent Proliferation, Promote Nuclear Disarmament

Seeking to Remove Nuclear Weapons from High Alert, Review Nuclear Doctrines,

Halt Threat of Renewed Arms Race, Committee Sends 13 Texts to General Assembly

Removing nuclear weapons from a state of high-alert, halting the threat of a renewed nuclear arms race and cementing commitments and efforts to do both reflected the positive progress in the field of disarmament, according to one of 13 draft texts approved today by the Disarmament Committee, as it began taking action on the more than 50 draft resolutions and decisions before it.

By a recorded vote of 113 in favour to 50 against, with 15 abstentions, the Committee approved a draft resolution seized with a review of all nuclear doctrines and immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons. (For details, see Annex VI.)

By its terms, the draft resolution would have the General Assembly call upon Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Reiterating its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used, the Assembly would call upon all States to comply fully with all commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that might compromise either cause or that might lead

to a new nuclear arms race, according to the draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments".

The Committee recommended that draft resolution to the Assembly by a vote of 165 in favour to 5 against (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, United States), with 4 abstentions (Bhutan, Federated States of Micronesia, Pakistan, United Kingdom). (See Annex XIV.)

Prior to approving that draft, a separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 4, which would have the Assembly reiterate its call upon all States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to spare no effort to achieve the Treaty's universality, and in that regard, urge India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

The Committee voted to retain that provision by 159 in favour to 4 against (India, Israel, Pakistan, United States), with 2 abstentions (Bhutan, France) (Annex XIII).

The process of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation went hand in hand, according to a draft resolution, entitled "Nuclear disarmament" (document A/C.1/64/L.48). By its terms, the Assembly would reaffirm there was a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament, and it would urge the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. It would also urge those States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems.

The draft resolution was approved by a vote of 112 in favour to 43 against, with 21 abstentions. (See Annex XII.)

Another traditional draft text, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), was approved by a vote of 164 in favour to 5 against (Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, United States), with 6 abstentions (Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, India). Among its key provisions, the Assembly would reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. (See Annex III.)

A separate vote was held on preambular paragraph 6, which would have the Assembly call on those remaining States not parties to the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

That paragraph was retained by a vote of 163 in favour to 4 against (India, Israel, Palau, United States), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan) (Annex II).

The Committee also approved, by a vote of 168 in favour to 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States), with 5 abstentions (India, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Pakistan, Palau), a draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/64/L.31). (See Annex XI.)

Prior to the text's passage, a separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 7, which calls upon all States to consider all relevant [nuclear-weapon-free zone] proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

The paragraph was retained by a vote of 165 in favour to 2 against (India, Pakistan), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, France, Israel, Palau, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex X).

Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

The Committee also approved, without a vote, a draft decision on preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, and on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes.

The following additional resolutions were approved by recorded votes: follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons; Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); and the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

General statements on Cluster I or introductions of draft texts were made by the representatives of Cuba, Nigeria, Pakistan, Brazil,

Egypt, Syria, Sweden (on behalf of the European Union) and New Zealand.

Explanations of vote were made by the representatives of Sweden (on behalf of the European Union), Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nigeria (on behalf of the African Group), Israel, Iran, Norway, Spain, France, Russian Federation, India, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Venezuela, Canada, Israel, Brazil and the United States.

Representatives of Cuba and Israel spoke on procedural matters.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Wednesday, 28 October, to continue to take action on all disarmament and security-related draft resolutions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to take action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under the disarmament and international security agenda items, beginning with its first cluster on nuclear weapons-related draft texts.

General Statements on Cluster 1/Introduction of Drafts

CAMILO GARCIA LOPEZ-TRIGO (Cuba) said he supported and agreed to the procedures; however, he asked about the availability of the informal paper, as his delegation had not received the document. He requested that it be given to his delegation in a timely fashion.

The CHAIR said that the informal paper had been distributed on Friday and posted online on Monday.

LAWRENCE OBISAKIN (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the African Group, introduced the draft resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) (document A/C.1/64/L.33). The draft had been approved by consensus before, with no substantive amendments, and he hoped it would enjoy consensus once more.

He also introduced a draft text on prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (document A/C.1/64/L.34), and likewise hoped the Committee would approve it by consensus.

ZAMIR AKRAM (Pakistan) introduced a draft resolution on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure

non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.24). He said that the demand for negative security assurances crystallized in 1968, but the response of the nuclear-weapon States had not been adequate. At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it had been agreed that it was necessary to conclude binding agreements, but, unfortunately, the declaration by four of the five nuclear-weapon States was insufficient.

He said that there were several justifications for negative security assurances, including the fact that the principle of non-use of, or threat of use of, force was enshrined in the Charter. Present statements not to use nuclear weapons were mere political declarations if not backed by a binding document. Even nuclear-weapon-free zones did not have ironclad guarantees. Only one nuclear-weapon State had given an ironclad guarantee.

Negative security assurances were unfinished business, which had to be completed, he said. New security doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks were not tenable. The Non-Aligned Movement had expressed concern about new types and possible deployment of nuclear weapons. The expansion of nuclear alliances had also increased the scope of use of nuclear weapons. Those situations were inconsistent with negative security assurance pledges and weakened the concept, lending great urgency to the task of concluding those assurances.

He said that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution sought to underline that sense of urgency and to see it backed up by concrete action. The resolution had been technically updated. They appealed to all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to work towards a common approach and formula on that matter. They believed that the conclusion of effective arrangements would constitute a confidence-building measure and contribute to reducing nuclear danger. The co-sponsors urged the draft's approval by the widest possible majority.

LUIZ FILIPE DE MACEDO SOARES (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden), introduced a draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments (document A/C.1/64/L.54).

He explained that the Coalition was a group of like-minded nations engaged in the nuclear disarmament agenda. Their goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The resolution concentrated

on nuclear disarmament. Building upon the increasing interest expressed in disarmament by global leaders, the group engaged constructively in consultation with Member States, with a view to getting wide acceptance in the Committee this year. They hoped that all delegations would be able to support the draft text and, as such, contribute and give concrete expression to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

KHALED ABDELRAHMANSHAMAA (Egypt), making a general statement on "L.3", on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, said that the international consensus on the resolution adopted annually was a manifestation of the importance given to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime in the Middle East region and globally. In view of the current positive atmosphere, Egypt was determined to move forward on nuclear challenges in the region, particularly emanating from unsafeguarded nuclear activity there. The draft had been technically updated to include factual references to resolutions adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding Agency safeguards in the region. Egypt looked forward to continued and consensual adoption of the resolution, as well as collective action towards its implementation.

Mr. GARCIA LOPEZ-TRIGO (Cuba) said that his delegation had co-sponsored several draft resolutions, including L.18, L.20, L.24, L.31, L.48, and L.40. It was unfortunate that those texts were adopted every year, but not implemented.

ABDULLAH HALLAK (Syria), speaking on the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), said that, at a time when nuclear weapons were being developed and stockpiles were being increased, when nuclear Powers had failed to fulfil the progress they had made at the Review Conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and 2000, there were pressures on States to acquire the means to secure their sovereignty under international laws and conventions. A blind eye could not be cast on Israel, which possessed nuclear weapons. Israel continued an aggressive arms programme on an assortment of weapons.

Hence, he said, the Middle East region remained the most exposed to those threats. Syria had been among the first States to have called for the region to become free of weapons of mass destruction, under international supervision. Yet, Israel had still not subjected its nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards.

MAGNUS HELLGREN (Sweden), on behalf of the European Union, said, regarding a draft resolution on African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

Treaty (document A/C.1/64/L.33), nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced global peace and promoted stability and confidence. He welcomed into force the Pelindaba Treaty, and congratulated all African States on that achievement.

RAYLENE LIUFALANI (New Zealand) said, regarding the draft resolution on nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/64/L.31), a technical glitch reflecting a sponsors' list was incomplete, and it should include a complete list of co-sponsors.

Action on Drafts

The representative of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the European Union, on the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), said the Union intended to vote in favour of the text, but that did not imply its support of the preambular reference to IAEA resolution GC(53)/RES/17. The draft before the Committee did not mention the serious proliferation risks related to Iran's nuclear programmes. The Union urged Iran to comply fully with United Nations Security Council resolutions. A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery. Practical steps, including Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, would be important confidence-building measures in the regional context.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wanted to clarify its position on the draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free world, accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, L.54. He was in favour of the main thrust of the text, however, the NPT was discriminatory in content and unfair in implementation. The nuclear-weapon States were preaching the NPT, but denying developing countries' right to developing nuclear-energy programmes. The NPT was applied unfairly. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed onto the Treaty in 1985, with a hope of peaceful nuclear-energy development. But his country's expectations had not been met. It was inconceivable to re-enter the NPT until its concerns were completely dispelled. A number of countries called for a legally binding treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. He would, for those reasons, vote against the draft.

The representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, said he believed there would be another revision to the draft

resolution on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/C.1/64/L.32/Rev.1).

The Secretariat said that the amendments arrived too late.

The representative of Israel said that the current situation on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East begged the question of whether the draft text on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, L.4, was realistic.

Proliferation existed in the Middle East, with four of five non-compliance cases overall taking place there, none involving Israel, he said. That was an alarming situation. The region also suffered from States sending weapons of mass destruction to it.

He said that Iran's ongoing clandestine activities totally disregarded IAEA and Security Council resolutions, and Syria's lack of cooperation with IAEA investigations were some examples. The draft text did not include enough information, and it singled out the State of Israel and overlooked the poor track record of other States in the region. Adopting such a resolution would not curb proliferation in the Middle East. and he urged other States not to support it. In addition, the draft included references to a divisive IAEA resolution. The fact that some States continued to support the Committee resolution was regrettable.

The representative of Iran, speaking on L.3, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, said that, as a result of Iran's initiative, the General Assembly had recognized the need for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The activities of the Zionist regime were the major obstacle in achieving that goal. The actions of certain nuclear-weapon States had actively hindered any progress in that respect. The contradictory approach by certain European Union members had also sent the wrong message to the Zionist regime, even though those States were parties to the NPT. The inaction imposed on the Security Council, with the support of the European Union members, had allowed the Zionist regime to explicitly acknowledge the unlawful possession of nuclear weapons.

The representative of Norway, speaking on L.4, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, said that, while he would support the text, his country shared the European Union's concerns about it. Norway was in favour of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Nigeria's representative stressed that the amendment he proposed

had been presented to the Secretariat at 5:30 p.m. The sponsors wanted the amendment in print, and not presented orally.

The Committee took up a draft resolution, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.3), which would have the General Assembly urge all parties directly concerned to seriously consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of proposal to establish such a zone and invite concerned countries to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Under the draft, the Assembly would call upon all countries of the region that had not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, the draft would have the Assembly invite all countries of the region, pending the establishment of such a zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing of such weapons or nuclear devices on their territories, or territories under their control.

The Assembly would also invite the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to assist in establishing the zone and to refrain from any action that ran counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution. The Assembly would also invite all parties to consider the appropriate means that might contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in that region.

A separate vote was held for operative paragraph 3, which takes note of resolution GC(53)/RES/16, adopted on 17 September by the General Conference of the IAEA, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East.

The Committee voted to retain that provision by 166 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (Côte d'Ivoire, India, Israel). (For details of the vote, please see Annex I.)

Next, the draft resolution was approved in its entirety without a vote.

The Committee then took action on the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), which would have the Assembly reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It would call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear

weapons, and place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security.

A separate vote was held for preambular paragraph 6, which would have the Assembly called on those remaining States not parties to the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

That paragraph was retained by a vote of 163 in favour to 4 against (India, Israel, Palau, United States), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan) (Annex II).

The draft resolution as a whole was approved by a vote of 164 in favour to 5 against (Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, United States), with 6 abstentions (Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, India) (Annex III).

The Committee then took up a draft resolution, on follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.6).

By its terms, the Assembly, gravely concerned over the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to reach any substantive agreement on the follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations, call for practical steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. The draft would also have the Assembly urge States party to the Treaty to follow up on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

A separate vote was taken on preambular paragraph 6, by which the Assembly would reaffirm the resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995 by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in which the Conference reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

The paragraph was approved by a vote of 109 in favour to 48 against, with 10 abstentions (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, Peru, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Serbia, Timor-Leste) (Annex IV).

The draft resolution as a whole was approved by a vote of 105 in favour to 56 against, with 12 abstentions (Annex V).

The Committee then took up a draft decision, on preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources (document A/C.1/64/L.17), which would have the Assembly decide to include an item of the same title in the provisional agenda for its sixty-fifth session.

The draft decision was approved without a vote.

The Committee then took up a draft resolution, on reducing nuclear danger (document A/C.1/64/L.18), which would have the Assembly call for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons.

Also by the draft, the Assembly would call on Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution was approved by a vote of 113 in favour to 50 against, with 15 abstentions (Annex VI).

The Committee then took up a draft resolution, on Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.20), approving it by a vote of 116 in favour to 50 against, with 11 abstentions (Annex VII).

The draft resolution would have the General Assembly, convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind and stressing that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations to reach an agreement on such a convention.

The Committee then had before it a draft resolution on the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) (document A/C.1/64/L.23), by which the Assembly would encourage States parties to resume direct consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States to resolve comprehensively existing outstanding issues on

provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto. The Assembly would also encourage nuclear-weapon States and States parties to work constructively, with a view to ensuring the early accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty's Protocol.

The draft resolution was approved by a vote of 172 in favour to 0 against, with 5 abstentions (France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, United States) (Annex VIII).

The Committee then voted on a draft resolution on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.24), approving it by a vote of 119 in favour to none against, with 58 abstentions (Annex IX).

That draft would have the Assembly appeal to all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and a common formula that could be included in an international legally binding instrument. The Assembly would recommend that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including those considered by the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further in order to overcome difficulties.

The Assembly would also recommend that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Committee took action on a draft resolution on Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/64/L.31), which would have the Assembly welcome the continued contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons. It would further note with satisfaction that all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas were now in force.

By further terms of the draft text, the Assembly would call upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet adhered to them and also urge all relevant States to cooperate in resolving outstanding

issues with a view to the full implementation of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, which entered into force on 21 March 2009.

A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 7, which calls upon all States to consider all relevant [nuclear-weapon-free zone] proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

Operative paragraph 7 was approved by a vote of 165 in favour to 2 against (India, Pakistan), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, France, Israel, Palau, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex X).

The draft resolution as a whole was approved by a vote of 168 in favour to 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States), with 5 abstentions (India, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Pakistan, Palau) (Annex XI).

Following the vote, the representative of Israel said he would have abstained from the vote and wanted that reflected in the record.

Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft resolution on African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (document A/C.1/64/L.33), which would have the Assembly note with satisfaction the entry into force of that treaty on 15 July 2009 and would call upon African States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. It would further call upon the States contemplated in Protocol III to the Treaty that have not yet done so to take all necessary measures to ensure its speedy application to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

It would also call upon the African States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that have not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the Treaty, and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997.

Also by consensus, the Committee approved a draft resolution on prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (document A/C.1/64/L.34), which would have the Assembly express grave concern regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all

States. It would call upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States.

The Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, to take into account radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention, and to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of that convention.

By a recorded vote of 112 in favour to 43 against, with 21 abstentions, the Committee approved a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/64/L.48) (Annex XII).

By its terms, the Assembly would reaffirm that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the two processes must go hand in hand and that there is a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament. It would welcome and encourage the efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, which is an effective measure for limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons geographically and contributes to the cause of nuclear disarmament.

The Assembly would urge the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems and also urge them, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems, while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons

It would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and call upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The text would, in addition, have the Assembly call for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally

and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein.

The Committee then took up the draft resolution, entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments (document A/C.6/64/L.54), which would have the Assembly call upon all States to comply fully with all such commitments and not to act in any way that may compromise either cause or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race. The text would also have the Assembly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to re-establish cooperation with the IAEA and to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, with a view to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The Assembly would, by the draft, call upon all parties to the NPT to spare no effort to ensure a successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and stress that this outcome should build upon the positive results reached at two previous review conferences and advance the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

A separate vote on operative paragraph 4 resulted in retaining the paragraph, by a vote of 159 in favour to 4 against (India, Israel, Pakistan, United States), with 2 abstentions (Bhutan, France) (Annex XIII).

By that provision, the Assembly would reiterate its call upon all States parties to the NPT to spare no effort to achieve the Treaty's universality, and in that regard, urge India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

The draft resolution was approved as a whole by a vote of 165 in favour to 5 against (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, United States), with 4 abstentions (Bhutan, Federated States of Micronesia, Pakistan, United Kingdom) (Annex XIV).

Regarding L.33, on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, Spain's representative said the treaty's entry into force was a major step for all African countries. Spain had always supported the treaty and related activities. However, having carefully studied the invitation to join Protocol 3 of the Treaty, the Spanish Government had decided not to sign. Underlining two issues, he said that the Pelindaba Treaty did not contain any safeguards in terms of nuclear

disarmament or non-proliferation that Spain had not already adopted. In addition, Spain had been denuclearized. As for L. 33, Spain had opted not to break consensus on the resolution, but it did not consider itself bound by the consensus as far as operative paragraph 4 was concerned and appealed to the sponsors to find a more balanced wording acceptable to all parties.

The representative of France said his delegation had abstained in the vote on L.23, on the draft on the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) (document A/C.1/64/L.23). A regional approach was needed for disarmament and non-proliferation to allow for progress in the area of security. He supported the establishment of such zones and had given security guarantees to more than 100 countries. In terms of those zones, France had regularly stated, within the NPT review process framework, that it was prepared to continue on that path. Indeed, the draft reflected positive developments, compared with the resolution adopted in 2007. France was ready to participate in an open dialogue on those issues.

Speaking on behalf of his country and the United Kingdom on the draft resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, L.33, he aligned the group with the statement delivered by the European Union. He recalled that the protocols annexed to the Pelindaba Treaty stipulated that nuclear-weapon States committed themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any African State party to the Treaty. He underlined that France and the United Kingdom had already complied with Treaty obligations by signing and ratifying all the relevant Protocols attached to the Treaty.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation had been able to support L.23 based on its fundamental support for nuclear-weapon-free zones created under agreements reached freely by the countries concerned. It welcomed the decision on a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in South-East Asia. It was ready to continue consultations with other nuclear-weapon States in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

He said that the Russian Federation also supported L.31, based on its fundamental support for nuclear-weapon-free zones created under agreements reached freely by the countries concerned. It welcomed the entry into force of the Central Asia and Pelindaba nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. It believed, however, that the adoption of those treaties should not mean the expansion of the areas covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones beyond legally established borders.

The Russian Federation had also been able to support L.54 this year, he said.

The representative of India said that his country abstained in the vote on L.4 as a whole and had voted against preambular paragraph 6 because the focus should be limited to the region the draft intended to address. India's position on the NPT was well known. The call to States outside the Treaty to accede to it and to accede to IAEA protocols was contrary to, and at variance with, relevant principles.

India had also voted against operative paragraph 7 of L.31 and had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

Regarding L.33, he said that India respected the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. That principle was consistent with the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and India shared and supported the aspirations of the States. It had conveyed unambiguous respect for the Treaty.

Turning to L.54, he said that India remained committed to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It shared the view that disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing and that there should be a credible time-bound target for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It had voted against the draft resolution, however, because India could not agree to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In fact, there was no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State.

The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on L.23, welcomed the draft resolution's support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and its encouragement of the five nuclear-weapon States and the States parties of the Bangkok Treaty to resume consultations on the outstanding issues. His country attached importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those could make an important contribution to regional and global security, provided they were established as set out in the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines. It was the United Kingdom's long-standing policy to support the principle of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and it regretted that the ASEAN States parties had not conducted consultations in accordance with the Disarmament Commission's guidelines before signing the Treaty. The United Kingdom was still awaiting a formal response to the non-paper issued by France, the United States and the United Kingdom to the ASEAN States on 4 September 2002. His country continued to stand ready to resume consultations with the concerned

States parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome regarding outstanding issues.

Turning to L.31, and speaking on behalf of his country, France and the United States, he emphasized the importance those countries attached to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, which could make an important contribution to regional and global security, provided they were established as set out in the Disarmament Commission guidelines. The three countries appreciated the willingness of the sponsors of the draft resolution to engage in constructive discussions of their concerns and welcomed the changes to the text compared to resolution 63/65.

He said that they still believed, however, that the text was contradictory to propose simultaneously the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would be composed largely of the high seas and yet say that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The three countries continued to question whether the real goal of the draft text was, in fact, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the high seas. They did not believe that that ambiguity had been sufficiently clarified. For that reason, they had voted against the draft resolution again this year.

Turning to L.48, the representative of Pakistan said that his country shared the goal of nuclear disarmament. However, Pakistan was convinced that the references to the NPT were unwarranted and, as such, had abstained.

On L.31, Pakistan had always supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with agreement reached freely by the countries concerned, he said. The call for its creation in South Asia failed to acknowledge the reality on the ground. The nuclear explosions in the region had disrupted the strategic balance, and with those explosions, the objective of the establishment of such a zone had been defeated. Pakistan appreciated the effort of the sponsors in revising the draft resolution, but the call to accede to the NPT had caused it to vote against operative paragraph 6 and to abstain from the resolution as a whole.

On L.54, he said that Pakistan could not accept the NPT-related references in the text, owing to its known position on that subject.

The representative of Venezuela said the delegation had joined

consensus on the draft decision on preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources (document A/C.1/64/L.17), and supported the text. She trusted that when the next resolution on the subject was adopted it would include, among other things, the notion that preventing terrorist and non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction would be the elimination of those weapons.

The representative of Canada explained his delegation's vote on L.4, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. He had abstained in the vote on the draft as a whole because the text unfairly singled out Israel. If the draft's goal was to stem proliferation, then it should require that all States adhered to and complied fully with their obligations. He regretted that Iran failed to comply with Security Council resolutions and he was concerned about recent revelations about undeclared facilities in Syria. He encouraged Syria to cooperate.

The representative of Israel said that establishing the Middle East as a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone was a vision to which Israel aspired. However, grave cases of non-compliance had not been included in the draft on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, L.3. The international community should not overlook that four of five non-compliance cases were located in the Middle East. Threats directed against Israel were exacerbated by certain States. Essential progress must be made through mutual recognition before such a zone could be attained. The creation of such a zone should emanate within the region. Matching political will must be demonstrated. Dialogue, taking into account viewpoints of all States, must take place. That had not happened at the recent IAEA conference and its resulting resolutions. Israel had not abandoned a vision where negotiations were possible over a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but only when all States took part in discussions could its realization be possible.

The representative of Brazil said his delegation voted in favour of the draft on reducing nuclear danger, L.18, because he was convinced that the review of nuclear doctrines was crucial to reduce risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. Brazil believed that reducing nuclear danger could not substitute for multilateral efforts. The mere existence of those weapons constituted a grave global risk. He would have preferred the thrust of the draft to have been the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The representative of the United States provided explanations of vote on three drafts. His country had voted against the draft on the

risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, L.4, which was unable to find a balance. Nor did it mention the failure of a country in the region to comply with the IAEA. However, he reiterated the United States long-standing belief in the importance of the NPT.

On the draft on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, L.24, he said the text did not accurately reflect the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States supported CD/1864, but could not support the draft as it was written.

Regarding the draft "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", L.54, the United States had engaged in intense consultations with the sponsors, but the two sides had been unable to reach agreement on the text. He looked forward to continuing discussions on the subject.

ANNEX I

Vote on Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

The draft resolution, on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.3), was approved by a recorded vote of 166 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian

Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstain: Côte d'Ivoire, India, Israel.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Uganda.

ANNEX II

Vote on Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in Middle East, Preambular Paragraph 6

Preambular paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), was approved by a recorded vote of 163 in favour to 4 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua

New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: India, Israel, Palau, United States.

Abstain: Bhutan, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Uganda.

ANNEX III

Vote on Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in Middle East

The draft resolution as a whole, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/64/L.4), was approved by a recorded vote of 164 in favour to 5 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,

Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, United States.

Abstain: Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, India.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tonga, Uganda.

ANNEX IV

Vote on Follow-up to Nuclear Disarmament Obligations from NPT Review Conferences, Preambular Paragraph 6

Preambular paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, on follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.6), was approved by a recorded vote of 109 in favour to 48 against, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,

Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, Peru, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Serbia, Timor-Leste.

Absent: Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Palau, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uganda.

ANNEX V

Vote on Follow-up to Nuclear Disarmament Obligations from NPT Review Conferences

The draft resolution, on the follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.6), was approved by a recorded vote of 105 in favour to 56 against, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,

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Written by John Hallam

Monday, 02 November 2009 09:39 - Last Updated Monday, 02 November 2009 09:54

Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu.

Abstain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, India, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, Tonga.

Absent: Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tuvalu, Uganda.

ANNEX VI

Vote on Reducing Nuclear Danger

The draft resolution, on reducing nuclear danger (document A/C.1/64/L.18), was approved by a recorded vote of 113 in favour to 50 against, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada,

Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

ANNEX VII

Vote on Nuclear Weapons Convention

The draft resolution Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.20) was approved by a recorded vote of 116 in favour to 50 against, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana,

Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

ANNEX VIII

Vote on South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty

The draft resolution, on Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) (document A/C.1/64/L.23), was approved by a recorded vote of 172 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,

Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstain: France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

ANNEX IX

Vote on Negative Security Assurances

The draft resolution, on conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/64/L.24), was approved by a recorded vote of 119 in favour to none against, with 58 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstain: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

ANNEX X

Vote on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere, Operative Paragraph 7

Operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, on nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document

A/C.1/64/L.31), was approved by a recorded vote of 165 in favour to 2 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: India, Pakistan.

Abstain: Bhutan, France, Israel, Palau, United Kingdom, United States.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Uganda.

ANNEX XI

Vote on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere

The draft resolution, on nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (document A/C.1/64/L.31), was approved by a recorded vote of 168 in favour to 3 against, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: France, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain: India, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Pakistan, Palau.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Kiribati, Monaco, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

ANNEX XII

Vote on Nuclear Disarmament

The draft resolution, on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/64/L.48), was approved by a recorded vote of 112 in favour to 43 against, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uzbekistan.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Turkmenistan, Uganda.

ANNEX XIII

Vote on Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, Operative Paragraph 4

Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (document A/C.1/64/L.54), was approved by a recorded vote of 159 in favour to 4 against, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: India, Israel, Pakistan, United States.

Abstain: Bhutan, France.

Absent: Botswana, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic

Republic, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda.

ANNEX XIV

Vote on Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

The draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (document A/C.1/64/L.54), was approved by a recorded vote of 165 in favour to 5 against, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, United States.

Dispatches and Statements from UN First Committee

Written by John Hallam

Monday, 02 November 2009 09:39 - Last Updated Monday, 02 November 2009 09:54

Abstain: Bhutan, Micronesia (Federated States of), Pakistan, United Kingdom.

Absent: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Turkmenistan, Uganda.

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