29 AUG 2016
INTERNATIONAL DAY AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTING
CTBT
Today  is International Day Against Nuclear Testing. Next month(Sept) will be  the 20thanniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  (CTBT), marked both by events in the UN and by a major international  conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, in which country the majority of  Soviet tests took place up to 1990.
Because the provisions for  the Entry Into Force of the CTBT specify that the CTBT can only enter  into force if 44 (named) governments including those of the US, India,  Pakistan, and China ratify it, even 20 years after its initial signing  in 1996, it has yet to officially enter into force. This is in spite of  the fact that the powerful network of monitoring stations that the CTBT  sets up for the verification of the norm against nuclear testing is in  full or almost full operation. It has proved its worth by picking up  even the smallest of the tests of the DPRK. (Its also proven very useful  for providing data for Tsunami warning and geophysical research). The  US, though one of its original signers, has failed to ratify the CTBT  because of Congressional opposition, largely from the Republican party.  China, as well as a number of other important countries, say they will  ratify the CTBT as soon as the US does so.
The US itself is riven  by a debate driven as much by Republican bloody-mindedness and hatred  of anything that even looks like the CTBT as by anything that Obama has  or has not done. Obama has talked about possibly getting the UNSC  (United Nations Security Council) to adopt an essentially hortatory  resolution, merely urging signature and ratification of the CTBT., as  well as a companion P5 statement. According to Krepon (ACW) the  resolution may not go much beyond urging the maintenance of existing  national moratoria on testing. The Obama administration has already  urged both India and Pakistan to sign and ratify it.
This  proposed UNSC resolution has already provoked a furious reaction from  GOP Senate hardliners such as Senator Corker, who accuse the  administration of exceeding its powers and 'going around the back' of  the US Senate. Corker also seems to believe that the 1999 US failure to  ratify constitutes some kind of 'unsigning' of the CTBT, though it is  nothing of the sort. As a signatory, the US continues to be bound by the  CTBT's provisions, and to benefit from the CTBT monitoring network.  According to Corker:
“Your administration seeks to ignore the  judgement made by a co-equal branch of Government regarding the Treaty.  Following the defeat of the CTBT the Executive branch came into line  with the senate's view through a 2007 statement of Administration policy  that 'it would be imprudent to tie the hands of a future administration  that may have to conduct a test'”
Corker later on notes, disturbingly:
“...a  political statement invoking the 'object and purpose' language could  trigger a limitation on the ability of future administrations to conduct  nuclear weapons tests.”
Actually Corker has it right here. The 'aim and object' of the CTBT is indeed, to prevent nuclear testing – by anyone.
Krepon notes concering the CTBT that:
“...Motherhood  and apple pie, no? Who wouldn’t want to oppose the resumption of  nuclear testing by China, Russia, India, and Pakistan? Who wouldn’t want  more leverage against the one outlier that still tests, North Korea?  What’s not to like about supporting international monitoring to help  deter covert, very low-yield nuclear testing, with the added bonus of  providing early warning to littoral states of oncoming tsunamis?”
Indeed  so! Far from accusing Obama of going around the Senate's back, Corker  (and other Senators) should really be getting on with the task of  ensuring that the US promptly ratifies and fully supports the CTBT, of  which it is one of the major beneficiaries. That they even contemplate a  possibility of testing is itself worrying in the extreme. The GOP seems  to want to hold onto the possibility that the US may wish to actually  resume nuclear testing, a development that would have catastrophic  global consequences. Any US test would be sure to be followed by Chinese  and Russian nuclear tests and of course the complete breakdown of the  painfully erected anti-testing regime that the CTBT represents. Pressure  does exist for a possible resumption of testing, notably from some in  the national labs.
A number of people within the US strategic  establishment have tried to argue that the proposed UNSC resolution  would actually be negative for CTBT ratification prospects. It is hard  to see how a resolution of the UN Security Council that strengthens the  norm against nuclear testing can possibly be of anything but benefit,  but their arguments essentially go that such a resolution might annoy  the Chinese, (who say their ratification will come at the same time as  that of the US), and make them less likely to ratify.
That being  urged to ratify might make the Chinese LESS likely to do so seems on the  face of it, odd. Much depends on exactly how it is done. It is  certainly possible that even a mildly worded resolution might perhaps be  vetoed by them (so a UNSC resolution may not actually come to  anything). That would be unfortunate. (and if the resolution DOES annoy  them it WILL be vetoed). Much here depends on the skill and tact of  those who negotiate the resolution, which clearly will have to, somehow,  have China on board. This particular squaring of the diplomatic circle  will be tricky but not impossible, especially for something as mild as  seems to be contemplated.
I have now argued for over a decade  that there are possibilities other than waiting forever for US, Chinese,  Indian, and Pakistani ratification.
However, if the CTBT is truly to enter into force, article XIV will have to be circumvented in some way.
A number of possibilities exist, and they are not mutually exclusive.
--A  group of 'Friends of the CTBT' could 'deem' that, whatever the  provisions for EIF, the CTBT has entered into force. Normally that would  mean that they would deem it to have entered into force FOR THEM.  However I would wish to argue that FOR THEM alone is insufficient and  that they would have to do the seemingly 'outrageous' and deem it to  have entered into force, period. Otherwise the exercise would be  pointless. If the CTBT is to be deemed 'normative' in customary law this  may be sufficient for it to enter into force not for a select group who  'allow' it, but for all whether they 'allow' it or not.
A slight  variant of this would be for all those who have ratified to date to  deem the CTBT to be in force, either for them alone, or for all whether  or not they are part of the majority of the planet who have now both  signed and ratified.
--A UNSC resolution could deem the CTBT to  have entered into force. Clearly it would be helpful if it were  unanimous. Certainly it would at least have to survive the possibility  of veto.
--An UNGA resolution could be adopted to the same effect. This has the merit of being veto-proof.
All  these possibilities are awkward but by no means impossible. All would  be sure to be contested. All would likely give rise to litigation at the  ICJ. All of them should be tried and all could (and should) be tried at  once.
At 20 years since its first signing it is long past time  for the CTBT to enter into force, and the dangers of a possible  resumption of testing, long thought to be unthinkable, may be shifting  to become all too real.
John Hallam
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