PEOPLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

ATTN ANTHONY ALBANESE, PENNY WONG, RICHARD MARLES NOW IS THE TIME TO DITCH AUKUS
(BEFORE AUKUS DITCHES US)

Dear Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and

Defence Minister Richard Marles:

The announced review of the AUKUS agreement by the Pentagon underlines the problematic nature of the AUKUS agreement to deliver nuclear submarines to Australia, and the insecure status of that agreement.

The cavalier attitude of the current US administration to agreements and treaties that have existed for many decades and on which its partners and allies rely, (such as NAFTA, not to mention NATO) suggests that the Trump administration is no longer a reliable partner, either in terms of trade, or most especially, in terms of security. The US can not, and should not, be relied upon to provide support in a security emergency, notwithstanding the strategic importance of Australia to the US.

Indeed, the very moral character of the Trump administration, with its authoritarian and anti-egalitarian streak, its overt corruption, and its affinity for regimes like it such as Russia and China and even the DPRK, in preference to egalitarian democracies like Australia, NZ, Canada, and most of Europe leave one asking if this is really an Australian ally.

Australia’s real security therefore, even now, relies on, and solely on, our continuing good relationships with immediate neighbours, and our ability to defend ourselves unaided. We should not rely on US cavalry coming over the hill. They will not come.

Nuclear submarines, whether of US, UK, or French origin are NOT inherently more stealthy than advanced conventional submarines. A number of instances exist in US exercises involving conventional subs in which the conventional submarine has shown itself much quieter than the US nuclear sub. These include an exercise over ten years ago in which a Collins class submarine eluded a Virginia class submarine (the class we plan to buy under AUKUS), and went on to 'sink' a US nuclear powered cruiser.

I noted in a senate submission of November 2021 that:

“--The actual performance of nuclear submarines is billed repeatedly as not only faster and longer range than that of conventional subs, but also as quieter. This is the opposite of what is actually the case. While conventional subs are noisy while 'snorting', in quiet patrol mode they are quieter than quiet. Even on You Tube there is video after video in which an advanced conventional sub evades a nuclear hunter-killer sub of exactly the sort we plan to acquire, and goes on to destroy a high-profile US target vessel. (Swedish subs 'sinks' USS Ronald Reagan, and Collins class sub 'sinks' US target – and advertises its presence

with 'land down under'.)(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saCdvAp5cow)

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8Kv4rqR6RQ.)”

I further noted that:

“Nuclear subs even at their quietest are far from truly quiet because reactors require pumps, and turbines and steam require lots of pumps, while electric motors and batteries and/or AIP can be run literally as a 'black hole in the water'. While this does not directly come under the Senate Inquiry's terms of reference,the Senate must surely have an interest in whether, in fact, the acquisition of nuclear subs is the best that can be done militarily and technically.”

As I argue, nuclear sub technology is NOT the optimal technology for Australia’s security needs, and that in fact the optimal technology (assuming Australia really does need submarines), is advanced conventional and AIP. The Senate may or may not have had an interest in whether or not nuclear propulsion really is the best technology for Australia's needs, but the Government itself MUST make judgements on such a critical matter.

Finally, there seems to be simply no way that US or UK nuclear subs could possibly be delivered within a meaningful timeframe. It is increasingly apparent that neither US naval shipyards nor UK ones have sufficient capacity for their own perceived needs, let alone spare capacity for building submarines – or critical sections of submarines – for others. Within the US, a series of Congressional inquiries and reports have emerged that substantiate this picture. However the UK situation does not seem to be any better.

The submarines are supposedly to be delivered to meet potential threats that if they materialise (and the threats well may do so), will do so within the next five to ten years. Yet nuclear subs if they arrive at all will certainly 'miss the boat’. The timing alone of nuclear subs, even if they do come at all, makes them irrelevant to meeting near to medium term threats.

In the event of a near to medium term threat for which a submarine capability is at all relevant, Australia will simply have nothing with which to meet that threat.

I would also emphasise in this context that a threat TO AUSTRALIA (as distinct from an ability by us to threaten others at a greater distance), would require the extreme stealth capabilities that the Collins class demonstrates in that otherwise light-hearted video – NOT the range and speed capabilities but greater noise of a nuclear submarine. In other words, the capabilities of advanced conventional subs and AIP (the ability to become ‘a black hole in the water’), rather than the range of nuclear subs will be more to the point in meeting threats to Australia itself.

—Australia should conduct its own, open, review of the AUKUS program.

—Australia should at least prepare to initiate a 'plan-B' capable of being delivered in a much shorter timeframe, and involving either off the shelf advanced conventional subs of either German, Swedish, French, or Japanese origin, or Australian variants thereof.

—Australia should conduct a thorough investigation of the relevance/role of

subs of any kind in its defence.

—Australia should ask itself how it proposes to ensure its security in the absence of meaningful assistance from the US.

In addition, Australia must as an urgent priority and in its own security interest: --Sign, ratify, and urge others to sign and ratify, the TPNW.

--Initiate meaningful action, esp in the UNGA First Committee, on nuclear risk reduction and No First Use of nuclear weapons.

While these last two initiatives are not submarine-related, we have made promising noises on both of them over a number of years but taken no real action, and either/ both of them promise to do far more that is meaningful for Australia’s national security than AUKUS ever could.

Aukus is neither the best way to improve Australia’s security, nor even likely to materialise at all. At the very least, it is sheer folly not to have a 'plan B', but in reality we should withdraw from it right now.

AUKUS may well turn out to have been the greatest mistake of our security policy.

John Hallam
Nuclear Weapons (Disarmament) campaigner
People for Nuclear Disarmament/Human Survival Project Co-Convenor, Nuclear Risk Reduction Working Group, Abolition 2000 Member, No First Use Campaign Global Steering Committee

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