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An ideologically unsound look at the 2015 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference

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An ideologically unsound look at the 2015 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference

John Hallam
Human Survival Project
People for Nuclear Disarmament
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From Monday 27April 2015 until late on Friday 22 May -- a whole intense, mind-numbing month of heady interaction about the ultimate life and death issue for the planet – 161 governments as well as a number of hundreds of NGO representatives, of whom the author was one, met in the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), in New York.


The 2015 NPT Review Conference was part of a five-yearly review process that has gone on within the NPT ever since the first review conference in 1975. The review process consists in three 2-week long 'Preparatory Committee' meetings held at UN venues in Vienna, Geneva and New York, followed by a Review Conference. There is a 'gap year' immediately after the Review Conference.

The schedule at these meetings– particularly at a Review Conference – is punishing, with early-morning caucuses followed by government briefings and then by a formal main session, paralleled by 3-4 'side panels', all at once, giving participants the feeling that they need to master Krishna's ability to multiply themselves and be in many places at once. There is intense social interaction too, often with diplomatic receptions at which diplomats and NGOs mingle and cross-fertilize. This makes for late nights on top of jet-lag.

The initial sessions of the main plenary were held in the vast General Assembly hall, with us poor NGOs relegated to the far too lofty reaches of the uppermost gallery where the only way we were actually going to meet a diplomat, even someone we'd known for years, was by chance at the Vienna Cafe in the first sub-basement, or at the computers in the same place. Later sessions, however, and the sessions of the 'main committees', especially the all-important Main Committee 1 (disarmament) were held in the more NGO-friendly Trusteeship Room or the Ecosoc Room, where it was possible to actually approach your favorite diplomat after she'd just named the 'elephant in the room' (the risk of large-scale nuclear war), and congratulate her for having done so. Like all of us, diplomats appreciate knowing they have gotten it right.(1)

While much that took place in the plenary sessions and main committees consisted of set-piece speeches read from texts (I too read from a prepared and well-practiced text in the NGO presentation session along with every other NGO rep)(2) – much that was truly important took place in the side-panels, held both by governments and by NGOs. Notably important side-panels included that in Conference Room 'C' held by IPPNW (in full) in the first day or so of the conference with Professor Alan Robock and researcher Lili Xia, on environmental and climatic consequences of nuclear war, and nuclear famine. Like similar panels held a number of years ago by myself and Steven Starr, this was 80-90 people, including a large diplomatic contingent, in a room designed for 50, discussing nuclear winter in a room in whose air-conditioning has broken down.

Other important side-panels included that held by the Swiss, Swedish and NZ Governments in the much more exalted Trusteeship Room, with Bruce Blair and General James Cartwright(retd) talking about the need to reduce the risk of an accidental apocalypse by lowering the alert level of nuclear weapons systems – primarily in the US and Russian arsenals. This was an issue that Steven Starr and I had gotten going in Conference Room C back in 2007, when Switzerland, Sweden, NZ, Chile, Nigeria and Malaysia got together and formed the de-alerting group.

Another side-panel on nuclear risks was held by the author with Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) and Rachel Bronson of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, with Seth talking about the risk of nuclear winter and human survival, myself talking about the risk of nuclear war, and Rachel answering the question 'How many Nobels does it take to move the hands of the Doomsday Clock? (quite a few and they must talk about it for a long time). I have organized panels on the risks and consequences of nuclear war at NPT and UN First Committee meetings since 2006. Unfortunately, as is the way with NPT meetings, our panel competed with the Austrian Government panel on the Vienna Conference, whose shadow rightly dominated the Review Conference.(3)

Why I mention all of this, quite apart from wanting to recycle memories of receptions in which conversations about nuclear weapons and nuclear risks with eastern European diplomats slipped pleasantly into the meaning of life, is because so much of vital importance in an event such as this simply never makes it onto the formal agenda. This applies both on a personal level, but also on the level of what is important for the planet and for human survival. A narrow focus on whether or not the conference has been a 'waste' of time and money because it did not come up with a final declaration misses this point. The formal Final Dec. may well not be the most important thing that has taken place, and what is most important is oft unrecorded.

Quite aside from any kind of Final Declaration that may or may not have had a snowball’s chance in hell of seeing light of day, let alone being implemented, the intense focusing of 161 governments, around 600 diplomats and a number of hundreds of NGO folk on the life-and-death issue of nuclear weapons for a month has, clearly, its own considerable value and is absolutely worth doing every five years. This is so, granted even that some of us (myself included) had to leave well before the conclusion of the Review Conference. Some really profound statements were made both by NGOs in the session devoted to NGO presentations and by the diplomats in those formal set-piece, read-from-a-piece-of-paper presentations.(Notably those of Sweden, South Africa, Austria, Ireland, and, at the very end, Palau.) When the total of all that takes place in such a conference is taken fully into account, the value of a final declaration, both from an individual participants point of view and from the view of benefit to the planet as a whole may appear like almost an afterthought.

I don't mean by this to imply that the actual words of the 'Draft Presidents Text' of 21 May (4) are of no consequence at all. Of course they matter. But I do mean to suggest that altogether too much emphasis is given to dotting every 'i' and crossing every 't' in a final declaration whose chief challenge, the challenge that most needs to be overcome, is that the P5 are going to ignore it.

The political dynamics of the meeting nonetheless are of considerable importance. I'll return later on in this piece to the Draft Presidents Text (or lack of any final text), and background a bit the developments that led up to the 2015 NPT Revcon. What follows may sound chatty but it's important for an understanding of what was/is at stake in the 2015 NPT Revcon and subsequently.

I have attended First Committee meetings since 2006, and every Prep-com and Rev-con since 2008, having followed them with rapt interest remotely via the Reaching Critical Will website since 2005.

Since 2006, at First Committee, Steven Starr of Physicians for Social Responsibility and myself started showing roomfuls of diplomats (that same Conference Room C, with 80 people jammed into a room where the air-con had yet again failed) – an animated graphic from Prof. Alan Robock's website that simply showed what would take place if India and Pakistan went at each other with roughly 100 Hiroshima – sized warheads, and then what would take place if the US and Russia went with their silo-based high-alert forces.

Essentially what the diplomats would see was the world turning black.

As the animated graphic shows darkness (i.e. nuclear winter) covering the earth, the packed Conference Room C turns silent. People would stop fiddling with their I-pads and just look, silently. Then, as the last piece of land, the southern tip of Patagonia, disappears an almost audible sigh would go round the room.

Steve and I did that to roomfuls of diplomats for a number of years – until they'd nearly all seen it. We felt like Chicken Little saying the sky is falling, but we had respectful attention – and then things started to happen, starting in 2010.

It was in 2010 that a statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons use started circulating, initially impelled by the Swiss and the NZ governments, two key parts of the de-alerting group with whom we'd worked closely, and then taken up by Norway, Mexico and Austria. It was in 2010 that the International Committee of the Red Cross brought out a powerful statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences, and also that a major study was done by Ira Helfand, on nuclear–war–induced famine, also focusing on the consequences of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange.(5)

The Joint Statement on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons started out with just 16 signatories, grew in a few months to 32 governments signed on, and now has over 160.(6)(a number signed on since its Apr28 delivery, when there were 159)

A significant aspect of that statement is its reference to nuclear weapons use as a potential threat to human survival. The Human Survival Project at Sydney University convened by Prof Peter King and myself laboured mightily in the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees in Vienna and Geneva to have human survival prominently mentioned as an issue at a stage when it seemed possible that it might be airbrushed out of the picture.(we were sure it would be). But by the time of the Vienna Conference government after government referred to it as a real issue. Its very mention rightly prioritizes nuclear abolition as an issue of existential urgency, not as merely something it might be 'nice' to do someday, some century. (Which is no doubt why the P5 were so keen to remove 'Human Survival' references from the final version of the Draft Presidents Text.)

The theme of nuclear weapons as a potential threat to actual human survival and of their elimination as thus a matter of existential importance was continued and amplified in the conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons convened in Oslo in 2013, in Nayarit, Mexico, in early 2014, and in Vienna in late 2014. Vienna was notable not only for its emphasis on consequences (with Prof Steven Mills presentation on nuclear winter before over 1000 diplomats and NGO reps), but also in its emphasis on nuclear risks, ably covered by Seth Baum, Bruce Blair, Eric Schlosser and others. The Human Survival Project (Peter and I) had specifically lobbied for this, not knowing if our pleas to Austrian and Mexican diplomats had worked until we saw the agenda.

All this education of the diplomatic community took place against a background that was increasingly threatening, and in which it became more and more necessary to trumpet about the 'elephant in the room'--the growing risk of a real apocalypse, not the 'mini' India vs Pakistan variety, but the full-grown Russia vs NATO variety. That ugly beast remains in the room with all of us—witting or unwitting, but never charged or convicted, inhabitants of 'Nuclear Death Row'. The 18 Nobels who in January 2015 symbolically moved the hands of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock from 5 minutes to midnight to 3 attested to this truth.

The NPT Revcon of 2015 therefore took place against a background in which it was (and is) more and more clear that global concern over nuclear weapons and nuclear risks on the part of 80-90% of all governments was and is growing.

At the same time it was (and is) equally clear that the mood of the P5 nuclear weapons states was (and is) less and less cooperative. And this is what has played out in the Review Conference itself. Even as it was still taking place the US tested a Minuteman missile at Vandenberg Air Force Base.(Which it said was 'routine'.)(7) Within days of the Rev-con's non-conclusion, NATO and Russian militaries were conducting (anything but 'routine') competing military exercises in the Arctic, with all the potential for inadvertent conflict and runaway escalation that such ill-advised confrontational tactics bring with them.(8) Not to mention the ongoing military confrontations that take place with Russian air forces on an ongoing daily basis chronicled by the European Leadership Network. The ghosts of 1914 would appear to have been summoned. Yet the US and Russia insist that nuclear war over Ukraine is 'unlikely'. The rest of us, governments included, are, rightly, not at all convinced this is so.

It is reasonable to ask, then, what might have constituted 'success' at a conference held with such a dynamic – in which most of the world is increasingly feeling the urgency of abolition, but in which actual nuclear threats are increasingly being used – underlining the reality of nuclear risk for anyone with eyes to see, including again, most governments.

Would it be reasonable to expect anything but complete deadlock?

But does the wording of a final declaration, or the ability to issue one, even matter?

At least one study suggests that the conclusion of a 'successful' final declaration at an NPT Review Conference has no impact whatsoever on actual real-world disarmament outcomes.(9)

The 2010 Review Conference Final Declaration is generally taken as the very paradigm of a 'successful' outcome, with its detailed road-map and 'action plan'. But it is widely acknowledged that almost no attempt has been made to implement that blueprint, and indeed that implementation 'gap' was a major issue through the entire 2015 Review Conference.

In a memo sent out to every delegate, both early/mid conference and again as negotiations became problematic, I suggested:

--It should be better than a mere 'roll-over' of the 2010 outcome.
--It should reflect the deliberations of Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna.
--It must reflect current concerns over increased nuclear risks
--It must appropriately declare the abolition of nuclear weapons as an urgent existential priority.(10)

Indonesia stated the obvious about the Revcon (and what we should expect from it), saying that:
'Nuclear weapons have the destructive capacity to totally eliminate human civilization. Its (sic) mere existence thus holds the entire humanity as hostage to its menacing potentials, and its accidental detonation or intentional use would unleash a massive catastrophe. Hence we expect that a clear reference to the humanitarian dimension and impact of nuclear weapons be adequately reflected in the outcome document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference'. (11)

Indonesia's statement calls us back to the simple truths about why we concern ourselves with these arcane matters, and why the Revcon matters at all.

South Africa, in a thoughtful and detailed contribution to 'subsidiary body-1', on 13May noted that:
'We must not forget that there are great expectations for the 2015 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We must have an outcome that is 2010 Plus and not simply a roll-over of the 2010 Action Plan. '(12)

The final negotiated Draft Presidents Text did not meet these criteria, though its earlier antecedents might have done so. However it did stubbornly retain more than traces of the concerns of Vienna, Oslo and Nayarit. Unlike some others I hesitate to say that it either rolled back 2010 or that it was 'a P5 text', or indeed, that it retained nothing of value.

My impression – based on multiple readings of the initial draft chairman's text (Chairman's Draft on Substantive Elements of 8May) (13) and its subsequent iterations and waterings down (14) (15) – is that, while even the very first draft text of 8May was weaker than it needed to be(and certainly didn't satisfy the criteria above) even the much more watered down version on 21May really cannot be described as 'a P5 text'. Indeed the more often I read it, the more what strikes me is what it still retains of Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna!

Sure, the final eviscerated 21May Presidents draft text (16) has elements (notably the fulsome praise of France’s disarmament efforts) that are clearly P5 inserts. It has other vital elements (such as every reference to that all-important 'human survival' element) clearly gutted by the P5. But it bears too many traces still of Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna to be remotely a P5 text, but is rather a 'text disfigured/gutted/mangled by the P5'.

The criticisms directed at the actual process by which the final edits were done – lack of transparency, selection of the negotiating partners, the possible application of various pressures to the 'recalcitrant' non-nuclear-weapons-state governments – would seem to be more firmly based, with Ray Acheson of reaching Critical Will lambasting
'...procedural decisions that decrease transparency and accessibility of meetings during the remainder of this Conference' (17)

But there is still far too much left of the concerns over catastrophic humanitarian consequences (which do become merely 'severe' consequences), to truly describe it as a 'P5 text'.

It is emphatically NOT the text the P5 themselves would have written Just look at the texts they DID write. (Including the joint P5 statement and the various national statements, in particular that of Russia!) Those are truly 'P5 texts!' (e.g., (18) (19))

This doesn't mean there is no cause for concern as, for example, a mysterious reference to 'national security' slips into what remains a reporting process which nonetheless is in its essence STILL completely objectionable to P5 security establishments. Yes, the reference provides a back door to evade its otherwise detailed reporting requirements. But the P5 would have used a front door built into the very fabric of their text, or just not observed any reporting requirements in the first place. Instead the P5 are asked to report on:
(i)the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes.(20)
Reporting requirements like this actually emanating FROM the P5 is inconceivable. That they should insert the words 'without prejudice to national security' before it all is nothing surprising, though reprehensible. Their strong preference clearly would be for that entire long para to disappear.

The important point here is that even the strongest efforts of the P5 to ruin the text are simply unable to remove evidence of the diplomatic world’s widespread concern over nuclear risks, human survival (despite the removal of the words, the concern still shines through), the urgency of abolition and its slowing or even reversed progress. Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna have so changed the dialogue that the worst efforts of the P5 are simply unable to change it back and make the final declaration into a 'P5 text'.

None of this in any way legitimizes the back-door processes by which the text was in fact watered down, or the mockery that some of the revisions made of the clear intent of the text agreed by everyone else.

The South African ambassador, Abdul Samad Minty, summed up the redrafting problem with respect to the specific issue of non-use of nuclear weapons thus:
'The phrase calling for the non-use of nuclear weapons ‘forever’ in the revised paragraph seems to indicate some among us wish to retain these nuclear arsenals indefinitely. This is an extremely disingenuous and dangerous concept, because if you say that, as long as you have nuclear weapons, you should be able to use them, then we who do not have nuclear weapons have a right to ask under what circumstances would you be prepared to use these nuclear weapons?'
And further:
'The wider question then becomes, who gives the nuclear weapons States (NWS) the right to use these weapons to annihilate all of us - simply because their perceptions may be wrong, or they may be reacting to perceived threats, which do not exist to the magnitude that they assess? How do we correct this perception? At which venue or forum are we prepared to discuss those security threats that affect all of us? We simply leave this to the countries that have nuclear weapons to determine, on behalf of all of us, when they should use nuclear weapons and to justify this use in advance, although they do not make clear under what circumstances they are prepared to use such weapons.'(21)

And, finally, Ambassador Minty took specific aim at the desire of the NWSIN FULL to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely:
'If for security reasons the five feel that they must be armed with nuclear weapons, what about other countries in similar situations? Do we think that the global situation is such that no other country would ever aspire to nuclear weapons to provide security for themselves, when the five tell us that it is absolutely correct to possess nuclear weapons for their security? Is this not a way to increase proliferation? How do we decide the needs of others who want nuclear weapons to preserve their security? Is it the case that we all recognize that they will never need nuclear weapons for their security? If the five are saying that, for the rest of us, you will never need nuclear weapons for your security, what is so unique about their security situation that makes it imperative for them to be the only countries that have the right to have nuclear weapons for their security? Who in the end will decide who should have nuclear weapons and who should not? If it is to be only the NWS, then we know from human experience that it is very rare in history that those with total power have voluntarily given up that power. In this case if the five had mistakenly believed that their security rests on the possession of nuclear weapons and the possibility to use them under certain circumstances, then it is an extremely dangerous world that they are creating for all of us.' (22)

Ambassador Kmentt of Austria, at the closing session, reiterated and emphasized the very themes the P5 sought (and failed) to extinguish:
“At this Conference, we have witnessed a clear shifting of the parameters, the focus, the tone and the balance of the discussion and the engagement of all countries of the treaty on nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states are today more empowered to demand their security concerns be taken in consideration on an equal basis.”

Ambassador Kmentt also hit the 'human survival button' once more:
“Madam President,
It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances. The only absolute guarantee against the threat posed by nuclear weapons is their prohibition and their total elimination. Although the nuclear weapon states bear the ultimate responsibility to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals, it is a shared responsibility of all states to prevent the humanitarian impact and effects related to these weapons of mass destruction.”

“The exchanges of views that we have witnessed during this review cycle demonstrate that there is a wide divide that presents itself in many fundamental aspects of what nuclear disarmament should mean. There is a reality gap, a credibility gap, a confidence gap and a moral gap.”

“After the discussions of the past weeks, we are now even more concerned about the existence of nuclear weapons and the apparent attempts to brush aside the facts, impact and risks of nuclear weapons.”

“Even the document before us shows the urgency to act upon the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, but then falls dramatically short of making credible progress on filling the legal gap in what should have been the forward-looking part....”
(emphasis mine)(23)

The final consideration that leads me to conclude that the final mangled document isn't a 'P5 document' and couldn't be made into one is of course its final fate.

Ostensibly it was torpedoed for language on the Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone.

According to the US closing statement:
“Unfortunately, the language related to the convening of a regional conference to discuss issues relevant to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is incompatible with our long-standing policies.” (24)

While the actual language on the ME-NWFZ in the draft presidents text is new and detailed (again, hardly a 'P5' final draft – far from it!), its actual provisions are NOT new and hardly unexpected. Egypt merely seeks with this language to nail down that a conference on a ME-NWFZ will actually take place without an evasion of commitments entered into way back in 1995! Furthermore the language the US UK and Canada object to can be seen coming down the track in a report by Subsidiary Body-1 of MC-2, back on 15May. (25) If it were within the ability of the P5 to torpedo that language, surely it could have been done there. Yet the complaint of the US and the UK is precisely that the sponsor of the language, Egypt, is unwilling to do what it has been 'told' to do! Egypt stood fast, to no-one’s surprise.

My surmise is thus that an 'excuse' was in fact being looked for to block the issuance of even the purported 'P5 text'. Which again, makes me doubt strongly that it ever really WAS a 'P5 Text'. Sure Israel thanked the P5 for blocking it. But if the P5 were so keen on the text they had before, they would not have ditched it. Israel had been effectively hung out to dry in 2010, and could have been once more.(Israel was 'furious' over the 2010 review final declaration. Yet the sky did not fall.) And if there were any difference between 2015 and 2010 it would be that the Obama administration now has even MORE reason to hang Israel out to dry, relations between him and Netenyahu having so drastically deteriorated.

Were there alternatives to what transpired?

There were.

We were told more than once at various government briefings that a vote could be taken. Consensus was not compulsory. Was a vote at the end ever seriously considered?

If it had been, a much better text than we had before us by the process of dilution and P5 browbeating could have been voted – without the P5, but presumably under NPT treaty rules, nonetheless binding on them.

At the very least the isolation of the P5 would have been clear.

Indeed, the very (if credible) threat of a vote might have been enough to moderate P5 behavior and demands.

The other alternative was of course a 'chair's summary'. Ambassador Salander of Sweden did that some years ago, and gave a (guitar) musical accompaniment to it.(Oh I believe...In summary... – to the tune of 'yesterday') Of course, a Chair’s Summary might be of the best quality, but obviously would have no 'status' as representing either a majority of parties or a consensus. It is purely a Chairs Summary issued on the initiative and authority of the chair. Nonetheless it has been a useful device in the past.

What remains?

I believe it was actually Palau who said at the very last gasp of the closing session that:
“The Humanitarian Pledge presented at this Review Conference provides a strong foundation from which to launch negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons. It is, in essence, the outcome document of this conference. If we are to succeed in averting nuclear catastrophe, we must work urgently together to fill the legal gap. Let the end of this conference mark the beginning of the end of the nuclear age.”(26)

Now signed by 107 governments, the Humanitarian Pledge, as it has become, is an impossible-to-ignore call to take action that will forever remove the veneer of legality from the nuclear weapons programs of the P5. And it will continue to grow. It states in part:
'all states parties to the NPT (should) identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (. . .), and the wish to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders (. . .) in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks.'(27)

The transmogrification of what had been a purely Austrian national pledge into 'The Humanitarian Pledge' was marked by the following statement on 18 May by Ambassador Kmentt:
“Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an announcement with regard to the Austrian Pledge. We are extremely impressed by the strong level of support that our national pledge has received. Currently over 80 States have endorsed and/or supported this pledge with several more States indicating that they will do so in the coming days. We therefore consider it important to clarify that it is no longer a national pledge only but a pledge supported by almost half of the NPT membership. For this reason, we have included a revised Pledge Document on the website of the Austrian MFA to take the broad international support into account.” (28)

The wish of 90% of the planet for abolition has perhaps never been clearer, and the gap between the nuclear weapons states and everyone else more gaping.

What is now required is concerted action, of a kind that cannot be blocked, to remove that 'legal gap' and forever stigmatize weapons that threaten the end of the world and possible human extinction as utterly illegitimate.


End Notes:

(1) Swedish Statement to Main Committee-1 by Annika Thunborg 7May 2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/7May_Sweden_MCI.pdf

(2)John Hallam, People for Nuclear Disarmament Presentation to NGO Session on May1st 2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/1May_PND.pdf
(3) Panel on Catastrophic Global Risks and Human Survival. May 6th http://www.pndnsw.org.au/articles/features/245-presentation-to-npt-revcon-2015-side-panel-on-catastrophic-risks-nuclear-weapons-and-human-survival.html
(4)Main Committee 1 Draft Presidents Text 21May2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/MCI-21May.pdf
(5) Ira Helfand Two Billion at Risk, Nov2013 IPPNW/PSR
(6) Joint Statement on The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 28April delivered by Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/28April_AustriaHumanitarian.pdf
(7) MINUTEMAN III LAUNCHES FROM VANDENBERG http://www.vandenberg.af.mil/mediacenter/pressreleasearchive/story.asp?id=123443432
(8)Russia and NATO Launch Massive War-games over the Arctic http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/05/russia-and-nato-war-games-over-the-arctic/
(9)Nobu Hayashi, Kjolv Egeland, The NPT Disarmament Fallacy, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nobuo-hayashi/the-npt-disarmament-fallacy_b_7306576.html
(10) John Hallam, Memo to NPT 2015 Review Conference Delegates (unpublished)
(11)Indonesian Statement to Main Committee 1 Wed 6May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/6May_Indonesia_MCI.pdf
(12)South Africa Statement to Subsidiary Body-1, 13May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/13May_SouthAfrica.pdf
(13)Chairman's Draft on Substantive Elements, 8 May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/MCI-CRP3.pdf
(14)Subsidiary Body 1 Draft Substantive Elements 8May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/MCI-CRP3.pdf
(15)Revised Draft Substantive Elements 12 May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/SBI-CRP1-Rev1.pdf
(16)Draft Presidents Text 21 May 2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/MCI-21May.pdf
(17)Unsilencing the Majority, 20 May 2015 Reaching Critical Will http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015/nir/9991-20-may-2015-vol-13-no-14
(18)STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 2015 TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REVIEW CONFERENCE http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/30April_UKJoint.pdf
(19)Statement by Russian Federation, 27April 2015, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/27April_Russia.pdf
(20)Draft Presidents Text p8, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/MCI-21May.pdf
(21) STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ABDUL SAMAD MINTY ON BEHALF OF SOUTH AFRICA, SUBSIDIARY BODY 1, 13 MAY 2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/13May_SouthAfrica.pdf
(22) As above
(23) Joint Closing Statement on Behalf of 49 States As Delivered by Austria, 22 May 2015, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/22May_Austria.pdf
(24) Remarks at the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference Rose Gottemoeller Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security United Nations New York City, NY May 22, 2015 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/22May_US.pdf
(25) The Middle East, Particularly Implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/SB2-CRP1.pdf
(26)Palau Statement to Closing Session of NPT Review Conference http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/22May_Palau.pdf
(27)General Statement by Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, 29April http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/29April_Austria.pdf
(28) Statement by Austria 18May http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/18May_Austria_MCI.pdf

 

Last Updated on Thursday, 04 June 2015 19:37